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## Spills Adv

#### Gulf of Mexico is resilient to oil spills

R&D Magazine, 4/8/2013 (Research shows Gulf of Mexico resilient after spill, p. <http://www.rdmag.com/news/2013/04/research-shows-gulf-mexico-resilient-after-spill>) [MN]

The Gulf of Mexico may have a much greater natural ability to self-clean oil spills than previously believed, according to Terry Hazen, University of Tennessee-Oak Ridge National Laboratory Governor's Chair for Environmental Biotechnology. Hazen conducted research following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster, which is estimated to have spilled 210 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. His research team used a powerful new approach for identifying microbes in the environment to discover previously unknown and naturally occurring bacteria that consume and break down crude oil. "The Deepwater Horizon oil provided a new source of nutrients in the deepest waters," said Hazen. "With more food present in the water, there was a population explosion among those bacteria already adapted to using oil as a food source. It was surprising how fast they consumed the oil. In some locations, it took only one day for them to reduce a gallon of oil to a half gallon. In others, the half-life for a given quantity of spilled oil was six days." This data suggests that a great potential for intrinsic bioremediation of oil plumes exists in the deep sea and other environs in the Gulf of Mexico. Oil-eating bacteria are natural inhabitants of the Gulf because of the constant supply of oil as food.

#### Drilling now

Vancouver Sun, 7/18/2013 (Gulf of Mexico rebounds as drilling rigs return in record numbers, p. [http://www.vancouversun.com/business/Gulf+Mexico+rebounds+drilling+rigs+return+record+numbers/8675518/story.html](http://www.vancouversun.com/business/Gulf%2BMexico%2Brebounds%2Bdrilling%2Brigs%2Breturn%2Brecord%2Bnumbers/8675518/story.html)) [MN]

The deepwater Gulf of Mexico, shut down after BP's record oil spill in 2010, has rebounded to become the fastest growing offshore market in the world. The number of rigs operating in waters deeper than 300 metres in the U.S. gulf will grow to 60 by the end of 2015, said Brian Uhlmer, an analyst at Global Hunter Securities in Houston. As of last week, there were 36 rigs working in those waters, according to industry researcher IHS Petrodata. Producers will need $16 billion worth of additional rigs to handle the expanded drilling, analysts including Uhlmer estimate. Demand is driven in part by exploration successes in the lower tertiary, a geological layer about 20,000 feet below the sea floor containing giant crude deposits that producers are only now figuring out how to tap. Companies such as Chevron Corp. and Anadarko Petroleum Corp. must do more drilling to turn large discoveries into producing wells - as many as 20 wells for each find. "The Gulf had more than its fair share of discoveries," said Chris Beckett, chief executive officer at Pacific Drilling SA. "Right now, the Gulf is the fastest growing deepwater region in the world."

#### PEMEX drilling is safe

United Press International, 10/24/2012 (Mexico’s Pemex to build oil response cap, p. <http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2012/10/24/Mexicos-Pemex-to-build-oil-response-cap/UPI-33931351078084/>) [MN]

British energy company BP said it signed an agreement with Mexico's Pemex to share oil-spill response technology for work in the Gulf of Mexico. BP, in response to the oil spill in 2010, maintains a deep-water well capping system that can operate in 10,000 feet of water. The company said it keeps the system on hand in Houston for global deployment. BP said it signed a deal to share technical information with Pemex so it could build its own capping system for use in the Mexican waters of the Gulf of Mexico. "Today's announcement builds on our commitment and the work we have done -- and continue to do -- to help advance global deep-water response capabilities around the world," Richard Morrison, BP's global deep-water response director, said in a statement.

#### Squo solves

Joe Hasler, 5/4/10, writer/reporter/researcher at Hearst Magazines, Special Projects Assistant at Popular Mechanics, “The State of Oil Spill Cleaning Technology

Extreme Spill Technology's "High Speed" Skimming Vessel Mechanical clean-up technology tends to work only in placid waters. Booms and skimmers can be rendered ineffective and unsafe in currents of more than 1 knot and waves exceeding 1.5 meters. According to David Prior, CEO and lead designer at Extreme Spill Technologies, his boat—the method for which has been successfully demonstrated for the Canadian Coast Guard—can not only handle rough seas, it can also travel at much higher speeds. Case Western Reserve's Aerogel In February researchers at Case Western Reserve University unveiled a sponge-like material of their creation composed of 2 percent clay, 2 percent plastic and 96 percent air. Their lab tests demonstrate how the sponge (called Aerogel) when applied to polluted water is capable of absorbing the oil and leaving behind the water. It can then be squeezed clean so that the oil can be recycled.

#### Size of the oceans means no significant impact from current activities.

Bjørn Lomborg 01, Director, Environmental Assessment Institute, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST, 2001 p. 189

But the oceans are so incredibly big that our impact on them has been astoundingly insignificant - the oceans contain more than 1,000 billion liters of water. The UN’s overall evaluation of the oceans concludes: “The open sea is still relatively clean. Low levels of lead, synthetic compounds and artificial radionuclides, though widely detectable, are biologically insignificant. Oil slicks and litter are common among sea leans, but are, at present, a minor consequences to communities of organisms living in ocean waters.

## Warming

#### Plan no solve

#### No impact

Hsu 10

Jeremy, Live Science Staff, July 19, pg. <http://www.livescience.com/culture/can-humans-survive-extinction-doomsday-100719.html>

His views deviate sharply from those of most experts, who don't view climate change as the end for humans. Even the worst-case scenarios discussed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change don't foresee human extinction. "The scenarios that the mainstream climate community are advancing are not end-of-humanity, catastrophic scenarios," said Roger Pielke Jr., a climate policy analyst at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Humans have the technological tools to begin tackling climate change, if not quite enough yet to solve the problem, Pielke said. He added that doom-mongering did little to encourage people to take action. "My view of politics is that the long-term, high-risk scenarios are really difficult to use to motivate short-term, incremental action," Pielke explained. "The rhetoric of fear and alarm that some people tend toward is counterproductive." Searching for solutions One technological solution to climate change already exists through carbon capture and storage, according to Wallace Broecker, a geochemist and renowned climate scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in New York City. But Broecker remained skeptical that governments or industry would commit the resources needed to slow the rise of carbon dioxide (CO2) levels, and predicted that more drastic geoengineering might become necessary to stabilize the planet. "The rise in CO2 isn't going to kill many people, and it's not going to kill humanity," Broecker said. "But it's going to change the entire wild ecology of the planet, melt a lot of ice, acidify the ocean, change the availability of water and change crop yields, so we're essentially doing an experiment whose result remains uncertain."

6 degree warming inevitable

AP 9 (Associated Press, Six Degree Temperature Rise by 2100 is Inevitable: UNEP, September 24, <http://www.speedy-fit.co.uk/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=168>)

Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees between now and the end of the century even if every country cuts greenhouse gas emissions as proposed, according to a United Nations update. Scientists looked at emission plans from 192 nations and calculated what would happen to global warming. The projections take into account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050, which are not sure things. The U.S. figure is based on a bill that passed the House of Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate, where debate has been delayed by health care reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, is the main cause of global warming, trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The world's average temperature has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. Much of projected rise in temperature is because of developing nations, which aren't talking much about cutting their emissions, scientists said at a United Nations press conference Thursday. China alone adds nearly 2 degrees to the projections. "We are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s environment program, which issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peer-reviewed papers on climate over the last three years. Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by 80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050, as some experts propose, the world is still facing a 3-degree increase by the end of the century, said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate scientist who helped oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world temperature by the end of the century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to limit warming to just a couple degrees. The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peer-reviewed climate change science to tell diplomats how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came out more than two years ago and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner said. Global warming is speeding up, especially in the Arctic, and that means that some top-level science projections from 2007 are already out of date and overly optimistic. Corell, who headed an assessment of warming in the Arctic, said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought, it looks like the seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago, Corell said. He said seas should rise about a foot every 20 to 25 years.

#### Their impact claims are alarmist and based on false climate data

WSJ, 1/27 (Claude Allegre, former director of the Institute for the Study of the Earth, University of Paris; J. Scott Armstrong, cofounder of the Journal of Forecasting and the International Journal of Forecasting; Jan Breslow, head of the Laboratory of Biochemical Genetics and Metabolism, Rockefeller University; Roger Cohen, fellow, American Physical Society; Edward David, member, National Academy of Engineering and National Academy of Sciences; William Happer, professor of physics, Princeton; Michael Kelly, professor of technology, University of Cambridge, U.K.; William Kininmonth, former head of climate research at the Australian Bureau of Meteorology; Richard Lindzen, professor of atmospheric sciences, MIT; James McGrath, professor of chemistry, Virginia Technical University; Rodney Nichols, former president and CEO of the New York Academy of Sciences; Burt Rutan, aerospace engineer, designer of Voyager and SpaceShipOne; Harrison H. Schmitt, Apollo 17 astronaut and former U.S. senator; Nir Shaviv, professor of astrophysics, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Henk Tennekes, former director, Royal Dutch Meteorological Service; Antonio Zichichi, president of the World Federation of Scientists, Geneva, “No Need to Panic About Global Warming”, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204301404577171531838421366.html?mod=googlenews\_wsj)

Editor's Note: The following has been signed by the 16 scientists listed at the end of the article: A candidate for public office in any contemporary democracy may have to consider what, if anything, to do about "global warming."

Candidates should understand that the oft-repeated claim that nearly all scientists demand that something dramatic be done to stop global warming is not true. In fact, a large and growing number of distinguished scientists and engineers do not agree that drastic actions on global warming are needed. In September, Nobel Prize-winning physicist Ivar Giaever, a supporter of President Obama in the last election, publicly resigned from the American Physical Society (APS) with a letter that begins: "I did not renew [my membership] because I cannot live with the [APS policy] statement: 'The evidence is incontrovertible: Global warming is occurring. If no mitigating actions are taken, significant disruptions in the Earth's physical and ecological systems, social systems, security and human health are likely to occur. We must reduce emissions of greenhouse gases beginning now.' In the APS it is OK to discuss whether the mass of the proton changes over time and how a multi-universe behaves, but the evidence of global warming is incontrovertible?" In spite of a multidecade international campaign to enforce the message that increasing amounts of the "pollutant" carbon dioxide will destroy civilization, large numbers of scientists, many very prominent, share the opinions of Dr. Giaever. And the number of scientific "heretics" is growing with each passing year. The reason is a collection of stubborn scientific facts. Perhaps the most inconvenient fact is the lack of global warming for well over 10 years now. This is known to the warming establishment, as one can see from the 2009 "Climategate" email of climate scientist Kevin Trenberth: "The fact is that we can't account for the lack of warming at the moment and it is a travesty that we can't." But the warming is only missing if one believes computer models where so-called feedbacks involving water vapor and clouds greatly amplify the small effect of CO2. The lack of warming for more than a decade—indeed, the smaller-than-predicted warming over the 22 years since the U.N.'s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) began issuing projections—suggests that computer models have greatly exaggerated how much warming additional CO2 can cause. Faced with this embarrassment, those promoting alarm have shifted their drumbeat from warming to weather extremes, to enable anything unusual that happens in our chaotic climate to be ascribed to CO2. The fact is that CO2 is not a pollutant. CO2 is a colorless and odorless gas, exhaled at high concentrations by each of us, and a key component of the biosphere's life cycle. Plants do so much better with more CO2 that greenhouse operators often increase the CO2 concentrations by factors of three or four to get better growth. This is no surprise since plants and animals evolved when CO2 concentrations were about 10 times larger than they are today. Better plant varieties, chemical fertilizers and agricultural management contributed to the great increase in agricultural yields of the past century, but part of the increase almost certainly came from additional CO2 in the atmosphere. Enlarge Image Corbis Although the number of publicly dissenting scientists is growing, many young scientists furtively say that while they also have serious doubts about the global-warming message, they are afraid to speak up for fear of not being promoted—or worse. They have good reason to worry. In 2003, Dr. Chris de Freitas, the editor of the journal Climate Research, dared to publish a peer-reviewed article with the politically incorrect (but factually correct) conclusion that the recent warming is not unusual in the context of climate changes over the past thousand years. The international warming establishment quickly mounted a determined campaign to have Dr. de Freitas removed from his editorial job and fired from his university position. Fortunately, Dr. de Freitas was able to keep his university job. This is not the way science is supposed to work, but we have seen it before—for example, in the frightening period when Trofim Lysenko hijacked biology in the Soviet Union. Soviet biologists who revealed that they believed in genes, which Lysenko maintained were a bourgeois fiction, were fired from their jobs. Many were sent to the gulag and some were condemned to death. Why is there so much passion about global warming, and why has the issue become so vexing that the American Physical Society, from which Dr. Giaever resigned a few months ago, refused the seemingly reasonable request by many of its members to remove the word "incontrovertible" from its description of a scientific issue? There are several reasons, but a good place to start is the old question "cui bono?" Or the modern update, "Follow the money." Alarmism over climate is of great benefit to many, providing government funding for academic research and a reason for government bureaucracies to grow. Alarmism also offers an excuse for governments to raise taxes, taxpayer-funded subsidies for businesses that understand how to work the political system, and a lure for big donations to charitable foundations promising to save the planet. Lysenko and his team lived very well, and they fiercely defended their dogma and the privileges it brought them. Speaking for many scientists and engineers who have looked carefully and independently at the science of climate, we have a message to any candidate for public office: There is no compelling scientific argument for drastic action to "decarbonize" the world's economy. Even if one accepts the inflated climate forecasts of the IPCC, aggressive greenhouse-gas control policies are not justified economically. A recent study of a wide variety of policy options by Yale economist William Nordhaus showed that nearly the highest benefit-to-cost ratio is achieved for a policy that allows 50 more years of economic growth unimpeded by greenhouse gas controls. This would be especially beneficial to the less-developed parts of the world that would like to share some of the same advantages of material well-being, health and life expectancy that the fully developed parts of the world enjoy now. Many other policy responses would have a negative return on investment. And it is likely that more CO2 and the modest warming that may come with it will be an overall benefit to the planet. If elected officials feel compelled to "do something" about climate, we recommend supporting the excellent scientists who are increasing our understanding of climate with well-designed instruments on satellites, in the oceans and on land, and in the analysis of observational data. The better we understand climate, the better we can cope with its ever-changing nature, which has complicated human life throughout history. However, much of the huge private and government investment in climate is badly in need of critical review. Every candidate should support rational measures to protect and improve our environment, but it makes no sense at all to back expensive programs that divert resources from real needs and are based on alarming but untenable claims of "incontrovertible" evidence.

## Econ

#### Plan no solve econ

### AND – Heg doesn’t solve conflict

Friedman and Preble 10 – Benjamin, research fellow in defense and homeland security at the Cato Institute, Christopher, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (September 21, “Drop Pretension to Supremacy,” http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=12156&utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(Cato+Recent+Op-eds)

Hawks and defense industry trade groups say this spending is essential to U.S. security. But much of Washington's military spending is geared toward defending others and toward the dubious proposition that global stability depends on U.S. military deployments. If our military had less to do, the Pentagon could spend less — at least $1.22 trillion less over the next 10 years, according to a Cato Institute report released Tuesday. Washington confuses what it wants from its military (global primacy or hegemony) with what it needs (safety). Policymakers exaggerate the capability of existing enemies and invent new ones by defining traditional foreign troubles — geopolitical competition among states and instability within them, for example — as major U.S. security threats. In nearly all cases, they are not. Geography, wealth and nuclear weapons provide us with a degree of safety that our ancestors would envy. Sending large armies to occupy — and try to manage the politics of — hostile Muslim countries is not effective counterterrorism policy. In most cases, it is counterproductive. Substantially reducing military spending means reducing U.S. ambitions. By shedding missions, the Pentagon could cut force structure — reducing personnel, weapons and vehicles procured and operational costs. The resulting force would be more elite, less strained and far less expensive. Making large spending cuts without reducing military commitments is a recipe for overburdening service members. Nor should Washington embrace strategic restraint just for budgetary reasons. A force reduction strategy would make sense even without deficits, however, because it could enhance security. It would reduce the possibility of fighting unnecessary wars, limit the number of countries that build up their military to balance U.S. forces, remove an impetus for nuclear weapons proliferation and prevent foreign peoples from resenting us for occupying their countries. Because a less active military can make conventional and counterinsurgency warfare less likely, we recommend cutting the Army and Marine Corps by roughly one-third. Fewer missions, along with advances in strike technology, would also allow for reductions in the Air Force and Navy.

### No regional rebalancing or security dilemmas—the only empirical data goes our way.

Fettweis 11—Professor of Poli Sci @ Tulane University [Christopher J. Fettweis, “The Superpower as Superhero: Hubris in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Paper prepared for presentation at the 2011 meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, Seattle, WA, September 2011, pg. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1902154]

The final and in some ways most important pathological belief generated by hubris places the United States at the center of the current era of relative peace. “All that stands between civility and genocide, order and mayhem,” explain Kaplan and Kristol, “is American power.”68 This belief is a variant of what is known as the “hegemonic stability theory,” which proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules.69 Although it was first developed to describe economic behavior, the theory has been applied more broadly, to explain the current proliferation of peace. At the height of Pax Romana between roughly 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring an unprecedented level of peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana in which no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could bring humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world, economic turmoil that could ripple throughout global financial markets. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to doubt that U.S hegemony is the primary cause of the current stability. First, the hegemonic-stability argument shows the classic symptom of hubris: It overestimates the capability of the United States, in this case to maintain global stability. No state, no matter how strong, can impose peace on determined belligerents. The U.S. military may be the most imposing in the history of the world, but it can only police the system if the other members generally cooperate. Self-policing must occur, in other words; if other states had not decided on their own that their interests are best served by peace, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could keep them from fighting. The five percent of the world’s population that lives in the United States simply cannot force peace upon an unwilling ninety-five percent. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental. In order for U.S. hegemony to be the explanation for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be preventing them from doing so.71 Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention, yet few choose to do so. Second, it is worthwhile to repeat one of the most basic observations about misperception in international politics, one that is magnified by hubris: Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we believe them to be. The ego-centric bias suggests that while it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. At the very least, the United States is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is. Third, if U.S. security guarantees were the primary cause of the restraint shown by the other great and potentially great powers, then those countries would be demonstrating an amount of trust in the intentions, judgment and wisdom of another that would be without precedent in international history. If the states of Europe and the Pacific Rim detected a good deal of danger in the system, relying entirely on the generosity and sagacity (or, perhaps the naiveté and gullibility) of Washington would be the height of strategic irresponsibility. Indeed it is hard to think of a similar choice: When have any capable members of an alliance virtually disarmed and allowed another member to protect their interests? It seems more logical to suggest that the other members of NATO and Japan just do not share the same perception of threat that the United States does. If there was danger out there, as so many in the U.S. national security community insist, then the grand strategies of the allies would be quite different. Even during the Cold War, U.S. allies were not always convinced that they could rely on U.S. security commitments. Extended deterrence was never entirely comforting; few Europeans could be sure that United States would indeed sacrifice New York for Hamburg. In the absence of the unifying Soviet threat, their trust in U.S. commitments for their defense would presumably be lower—if in fact that commitment was at all necessary outside of the most pessimistic works of fiction. Furthermore, in order for hegemonic stability logic to be an adequate explanation for restrained behavior, allied states must not only be fully convinced of the intentions and capability of the hegemon to protect their interests; they must also trust that the hegemon can interpret those interests correctly and consistently. As discussed above, the allies do not feel that the United States consistently demonstrates the highest level of strategic wisdom. In fact, they often seem to look with confused eyes upon our behavior, and are unable to explain why we so often find it necessary to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. They will participate at times in our adventures, but minimally and reluctantly. Finally, while believers in hegemonic stability as the primary explanation for the long peace have articulated a logic that some find compelling, they are rarely able to cite much evidence to support their claims. In fact, the limited empirical data we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on defense fairly substantially, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 that it did in 1990, which was a twenty-five percent reduction.72 To defense hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace,” argued Kristol and Kagan.”73 If global stability were unrelated to U.S. hegemony, however, one would not have expected an increase in conflict and violence. The verdict from the last two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces.74 No state believed that its security was endangered by a less-capable U.S. military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No defense establishments were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred after the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped that spending back up. The two phenomena are unrelated. These figures will not be enough to convince skeptics. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability, and one could also presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not be expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, two points deserve to be made. First, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, it would remain the case that stability can be maintained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if, as many suspect, this era of global peace proves to be inherently stable because normative evolution is typically unidirectional, then no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spending.75 Abandoning the mission to stabilize the world would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. Second, it is also worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then surely hegemonists would note that their expectations had been justified. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the relationship between U.S. power and international stability suggests that the two are unrelated. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone. It requires a good deal of hubris for any actor to consider itself indispensable to world peace. Far from collapsing into a whirlwind of chaos, the chances are high that the world would look much like it does now if the United States were to cease regarding itself as God’s gladiator on earth. The people of the United States would be a lot better off as well.

## Soil Erosion

Wood Straw solves erosion, and there are multiple alt causes

Science Daily 07 (10/15, “Controlling Soil Erosion,” *Science News,*

http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/10/071014192741.htm)

The patented WoodStraw brand wood-based erosion control material is highly effective. An American Society of Agricultural and Biological Engineers study in California and Washington indicated application of the WoodStraw product reduced erosion by 98 percent compared to bare soil. In addition, a field experiment by the USDA Forest Service in Colorado noted WoodStraw outperformed all other mulch treatments. WoodStraw is naturally weed-free and long-lasting. Since its introduction, WoodStraw has achieved regulatory approval by the Washington State Department of Transportation for use on transportation projects across the state and is recognized by the Washington Department of Ecology as an effective erosion control material. Research and scientific progress continue to shed light on new benefits of WoodStraw. The product is currently being evaluated to see how it would perform for wind erosion and dust control on construction sites and for controlling blowing ash on burned areas such as rangelands.

Erosion inevitable; natural and artificial alt causes

Maine Bureau of Land and Water Quality 2K (<http://www.state.me.us/dep/blwq/doceducation/dirt.htm>)

Soil erosion is the #1 source of pollution to surface water in Maine. Each year rainstorms and snowmelt wash tons of dirt off the land around Maine. How could something so ‘natural’ be so bad? Soil erosion is natural after all. However, when we change the landscape from forest to yards, streets, farm fields, shopping centers and roads, we accelerate soil erosion. In the USA, soil is eroding at about *seventeen times* the rate at which it forms. Erosion results in:  (1) higher project costs, (2) damage to aquatic habitat, (3) reduced water quality, (4) elimination of trout and salmon fisheries, (5) lower shorefront property values, (6) higher property taxes, and (6) loss of business and jobs.  Soil is a valuable resource on the land, but when washed into streams, lakes, and estuaries it is Maine's biggest water quality problem

Most damaging erosion caused naturally

The National Soil Erosion Research Laboratory (no date) (“Soil Erosion and WEPP Technology,” <http://topsoil.nserl.purdue.edu/nserlweb/weppmain/overview/intro.html>)

Today's society often times focuses on sensational news and short term crises which surround us. By constantly dwelling in the present, many people ignore the long term problems that compound slowly until they reach a crisis level, and may then be very difficult or impossible to correct. [Soil erosion](http://topsoil.nserl.purdue.edu/nserlweb/weppmain/overview/ersn.html) is a continuing long term problem. Natural processes such as the production of soil occur at an alarmingly slower rate than soil can be lost. It is estimated that over 3 billion metric tons of soil are eroded off of our fields and pastures each year by water erosion alone. The main variables affecting water erosion are [precipitation](http://topsoil.nserl.purdue.edu/nserlweb/weppmain/overview/precip.html) and [surface runoff](http://topsoil.nserl.purdue.edu/nserlweb/weppmain/overview/runoff.html). Raindrops, the most common form of precipitation, can be very destructive when they strike bare soil. With impacts of over 20 mph, raindrops splash grains of soil into the air and wash out seeds. Overland flow, or surface runoff, then carries away the detached soil, and may detach additional soils and then sediment which can be deposited elsewhere. [Sheet](http://topsoil.nserl.purdue.edu/nserlweb/weppmain/overview/sheet.html) and [interrill erosion](http://topsoil.nserl.purdue.edu/nserlweb/weppmain/overview/intrrll.html) are mainly caused by rainfall. However, some of the more severe erosion problems such as [rill erosion](http://topsoil.nserl.purdue.edu/nserlweb/weppmain/overview/rill.html), [channel erosion](http://topsoil.nserl.purdue.edu/nserlweb/weppmain/overview/channel.html), and [gully erosion](http://topsoil.nserl.purdue.edu/nserlweb/weppmain/overview/gullies.html) all result from concentrated overland flow. Other types of erosion by water include [landslides](http://topsoil.nserl.purdue.edu/nserlweb/weppmain/overview/lndsld.html).

# 2NC

Hard debate good debate – Hard debate is good debates – forcing the 2AC to think about multiple 2NR options and strategic cross applications

Logical opportunity cost to the plan – do they plan can’t do advocacies

Advocacy skills – key to making the aff defend the middle ground – most real world – Obama had to defend healthcare from the left and the right

Information overload – necessary to learn

Neg Flex – the aff has first and last speech – 2AR persuasion – multiple positions are key to fairness

Condo key to fairness

No in-round abuse – potential abuse isn’t a voter – multiple conditional T interpretations means condo is inevitable – at worst reject the team not the arg

## 2NC – Impact Calc

### Critique outweighs the aff:

### Only scenario for solving extinction – the plan minsuderstands conflict and plays with fire allowing for continued escalation of conflit through violence intervention – only demilitarization can prevent future conflict – focusing on the structural factors that make extinction possible is a pre-requisite – that’s Dably and Ahmed

## 2NC – Epistemology First

### The roll of the ballot is to question the epistemology of the 1AC – if we win that it sucks it should be rejected – we don’t have to win that it was totally worthless but rather that it was of such poor quality the aff should be forced to re-write its 1AC

### Education – Forces good research skills and evidence quality as well as the underlying assumptions of the 1AC

### Decision Making – fosters one to read only positions they can advocate or learn to advocate – only portable skill

### A-priori for policy debate – it’s the fundamental political question

* Our lack of epistemological interrogation limits our ability to solve global problems
* Policymakers dislike epistemology – studies prove
* Metaphysics first
* No cede of political
* Research and scholarly writing lead to political change
* Questions key to politics

Reus-Smit 12– Professor of International Relations at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy (Christian, “International Relations, Irrelevant? Don’t Blame Theory”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies June 2012 vol. 40 no. 3 525-540,)

However widespread it might be, the notion that IR’s lack of practical relevance stems from excessive theorising rests more on vigorous assertion than weighty evidence. As noted above, we lack good data on the field’s practical relevance, and the difficulties establishing appropriate measures are all too apparent in the fraught attempts by several governments to quantify the impact of the humanities and social sciences more generally. Beyond this, though, we lack any credible evidence that any fluctuations in the field’s relevance are due to more or less high theory. We hear that policymakers complain of not being able to understand or apply much that appears in our leading journals, but it is unclear why we should be any more concerned about this than physicists or economists, who take theory, even high theory, to be the bedrock of advancement in knowledge. Moreover, there is now a wealth of research, inside and outside IR, that shows that policy communities are not open epistemic or cognitive realms, simply awaiting well-communicated, non-jargonistic knowledge – they are bureaucracies, deeply susceptible to groupthink, that filter information through their own intersubjective frames. 10 Beyond this, however, there are good reasons to believe that precisely the reverse of the theory versus relevance thesis might be true; that theoretical inquiry may be a necessary prerequisite for the generation of practically relevant knowledge. I will focus here on the value of metatheory, as this attracts most contemporary criticism and would appear the most difficult of theoretical forms to defend. Metatheories take other theories as their subject. Indeed, their precepts establish the conditions of possibility for second-order theories. In general, metatheories divide into three broad categories: epistemology, ontology and meta-ethics. The first concerns the nature, validity and acquisition of knowledge; the second, the nature of being (what can be said to exist, how things might be categorised and how they stand in relation to one another); and the third, the nature of right and wrong, what constitutes moral argument, and how moral arguments might be sustained. Second-order theories are constructed within, and on the basis of, assumptions formulated at the metatheoretical level. Epistemological assumptions about what constitutes legitimate knowledge and how it is legitimately acquired delimit the questions we ask and the kinds of information we can enlist in answering them. 11 Can social scientists ask normative questions? Is literature a valid source of social-scientific knowledge? Ontological assumptions about the nature and distinctiveness of the social universe affect not only what we ‘see’ but also how we order what we see; how we relate the material to the ideational, agents to structures, interests to beliefs, and so on. If we assume, for example, that individuals are rational actors, engaged in the efficient pursuit of primarily material interests, then phenomena such as faith-motivated politics will remain at the far periphery of our vision. 12 Lastly, meta-ethical assumptions about the nature of the good, and about what constitutes a valid moral argument, frame how we reason about concrete ethical problems. Both deontology and consequentialism are meta-ethical positions, operationalised, for example, in the differing arguments of Charles Beitz and Peter Singer on global distributive justice. 13 Most scholars would acknowledge the background, structuring role that metatheory plays, but argue that we can take our metatheoretical assumptions off the shelf, get on with the serious business of research and leave explicit metatheoretical reflection and debate to the philosophers. If practical relevance is one of our concerns, however, there are several reasons why this is misguided. Firstly, whether IR is practically relevant depends, in large measure, on the kinds of questions that animate our research. I am not referring here to the commonly held notion that we should be addressing questions that practitioners want answered. Indeed, our work will at times be most relevant when we pursue questions that policymakers and others would prefer left buried. My point is a different one, which I return to in greater detail below. It is sufficient to note here that being practically relevant involves asking questions of practice; not just retrospective questions about past practices – their nature, sources and consequences – but prospective questions about what human agents should do. As I have argued elsewhere, being practically relevant means asking questions of how we, ourselves, or some other actors (states, policymakers, citizens, NGOs, IOs, etc.) should act. 14 Yet our ability, nay willingness, to ask such questions is determined by the metatheoretical assumptions that structure our research and arguments. This is partly an issue of ontology – what we see affects how we understand the conditions of action, rendering some practices possible or impossible, mandatory or beyond the pale. If, for example, we think that political change is driven by material forces, then we are unlikely to see communicative practices of argument and persuasion as potentially successful sources of change. More than this, though, it is also an issue of epistemology. If we assume that the proper domain of IR as a social science is the acquisition of empirically verifiable knowledge, then we will struggle to comprehend, let alone answer, normative questions of how we should act. We will either reduce ‘ought’ questions to ‘is’ questions, or place them off the agenda altogether. 15 Our metatheoretical assumptions thus determine the macro-orientation of IR towards questions of practice, directly affecting the field’s practical relevance**.** Secondly, metatheoretical revolutions license new second-order theoretical and analytical possibilities while foreclosing others, directly affecting those forms of scholarship widely considered most practically relevant. The rise of analytical eclecticism illustrates this. As noted above, Katzenstein and Sil’s call for a pragmatic approach to the study of world politics, one that addresses real-world problematics by combining insights from diverse research traditions, resonates with the mood of much of the field, especially within the American mainstream. Epistemological and ontological debates are widely considered irresolvable dead ends, grand theorising is unfashionable, and gladiatorial contests between rival paradigms appear, increasingly, as unimaginative rituals. Boredom and fatigue are partly responsible for this new mood, but something deeper is at work. Twenty-five years ago, Sil and Katzenstein’s call would have fallen on deaf ears; the neo-neo debate that preoccupied the American mainstream occurred within a metatheoretical consensus, one that combined a neo-positivist epistemology with a rationalist ontology. This singular metatheoretical framework defined the rules of the game; analytical eclecticism was unimaginable. The Third Debate of the 1980s and early 1990s destabilised all of this; not because American IR scholars converted in their droves to critical theory or poststructuralism (far from it), but because metatheoretical absolutism became less and less tenable. The anti-foundationalist critique of the idea that there is any single measure of truth did not produce a wave of relativism, but it did generate a widespread sense that battles on the terrain of epistemology were unwinnable. Similarly, the Third Debate emphasis on identity politics and cultural particularity, which later found expression in constructivism, did not vanquish rationalism. It did, however, establish a more pluralistic, if nevertheless heated, debate about ontology, a terrain on which many scholars felt more comfortable than that of epistemology. One can plausibly argue, therefore, that the metatheoretical struggles of the Third Debate created a space for – even made possible – the rise of analytical eclecticism and its aversion to metatheoretical absolutes, a principal benefit of which is said to be greater practical relevance. Lastly, most of us would agree that for our research to be practically relevant, it has to be good – it has to be the product of sound inquiry, and our conclusions have to be plausible. The pluralists among us would also agree that different research questions require different methods of inquiry and strategies of argument. Yet across this diversity there are several practices widely recognised as essential to good research. Among these are clarity of purpose, logical coherence, engagement with alternative arguments and the provision of good reasons (empirical evidence, corroborating arguments textual interpretations, etc.). Less often noted, however, is the importance of metatheoretical reflexivity. If our epistemological assumptions affect the questions we ask, then being conscious of these assumptions is necessary to ensure that we are not fencing off questions of importance, and that if we are, we can justify our choices. Likewise, if our ontological assumptions affect how we see the social universe, determining what is in or outside our field of vision, then reflecting on these assumptions can prevent us being blind to things that matter. A similar argument applies to our meta-ethical assumptions. Indeed, if deontology and consequentialism are both meta-ethical positions, as I suggested earlier, then reflecting on our choice of one or other position is part and parcel of weighing rival ethical arguments (on issues as diverse as global poverty and human rights). Finally, our epistemological, ontological and meta-ethical assumptions are not metatheoretical silos; assumptions we make in one have a tendency to shape those we make in another. The oft-heard refrain that ‘if we can’t measure it, it doesn’t matter’ is an unfortunate example of epistemology supervening on ontology, something that metatheoretical reflexivity can help guard against. In sum, like clarity, coherence, consideration of alternative arguments and the provision of good reasons, metatheoretical reflexivity is part of keeping us honest, making it practically relevant despite its abstraction.

### Turns case – failure to interrogate the assumption behind a policy ensure problematic results and solutions that offer poor side affects – that’s Ahmed

### External impact – side affects of flawed policy based on their epistemology causes violence and the death of millions – that’t Vanaga

## 2NC – Framework

### Framework assumes the get their aff – they first must win epistemology isn’t first

### Interrogating the 1AC’s assumptions is more political than the aff

David Grondin, Lecturer in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Quebec at Montreal, 2004, “(Re)Writing the “National Security State”: How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War”, <http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/rewriting_national_security_state.pdf>, KENTUCKY

* The political as well as democracy has been restricted by a lack of epistemological interrogation
* Poststructuralism allows for a change of politics – theory can become practice
* Poststructuralism allows for more effective and adaptive personal confronting of problems – this means we access individual epistemological change
* The political in the status quo dislikes epistemology – politics includes everyone

Rethinking the Political from a Poststructuralist Stance [O]ur political imagination has been restricted by our uncritical acceptance of our own rhetorical construction of democracy, a construction that pri- vileges free-enterprise capitalism and republicanism. Such a construction – limiting, as it does, our ability to understand both ourselves and others – needs to be rhetorically reconstructed to serve the needs of globalism as different nations struggle toward their own definitions, policies, and prac- tices. The first step in such a rhetorical recons- truction is to become aware of our own language choices and the narratives and assumptions embedded in these choices (Medhurst, 2000: 16). A poststructuralist approach to international relations reassesses the nature of the political. Indeed, it calls for the repoliticization of practices of world politics that have been treated as if they were not political. For instance, limiting the ontological elements in one’s inquiry to states or great powers is a political choice. As Jenny Edkins puts it, we need to “bring the political back in” (Edkins, 1998: xii). For most analysts of International Relations, the conception of the “political” is narrowly restricted to politics as practiced by politicians. However, from a poststructuralist viewpoint, the “political” acquires a broader meaning, especially since practice is not what most theorists are describing as practice. Poststructuralism sees theoretical discourse not only as discourse, but also as political practice. Theory therefore becomes practice. The political space of poststructuralism is not that of exclusion; it is the political space of postmodernity, a dichotomous one, where one thing always signifies at least one thing and another (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 14). Poststructuralism thus gives primacy to the political, since it acts on us, while we act in its name, and leads us to identify and differentiate ourselves from others. This political act is never complete and celebrates undecidability, whereas decisions, when taken, express the political moment. It is a critical attitude which encourages dissidence from traditional approaches (Ashley and Walker, 1990a and 1990b). It does not represent one single philosophical approach or perspective, nor is it an alternative paradigm (Tvathail, 1996: 172). It is a nonplace, a border line falling between international and domestic politics (Ashley, 1989). The poststructuralist analyst questions the borderlines and dichotomies of modernist discourses, such as inside/outside, the constitution of the Self/Other, and so on. In the act of definition, difference – thereby the discourse of otherness – is highlighted, since one always defines an object with regard to what it is not (Knafo, 2004). As Simon Dalby asserts, “It involves the social construction of some other person, group, culture, race, nationality or political system as different from ‘our’ person, group, etc. Specifying difference is a linguistic, epistemological and, most importantly, a political act; it constructs a space for the other distanced and inferior from the vantage point of the person specifying the difference” (Dalby, cited in Tvathail, 1996: 179). Indeed, poststructuralism offers no definitive answers, but leads to new questions and new unexplored grounds. This makes the commitment to the incomplete nature of the political and of political analysis so central to poststructuralism (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 15). As Jim George writes, “It is postmodern resistance in the sense that while it is directly (and sometimes violently) engaged with modernity, it seeks to go beyond the repressive, closed aspects of modernist global existence. It is, therefore, not a resistance of traditional grand-scale emancipation or conventional radicalism imbued with authority of one or another sovereign presence. Rather, in opposing the large-scale brutality and inequity in human society, it is a resistance active also at the everyday, com- munity, neighbourhood, and interpersonal levels, where it confronts those processes that systematically exclude people from making decisions about who they are and what they can be” (George, 1994: 215, emphasis in original). In this light, poststructural practices are used critically to investigate how the subject of international relations is constituted in and through the discourses and texts of global politics. Treating theory as discourse opens up the possibility of historicizing it. It is a myth that theory can be abstracted from its socio-historical context, from reality, so to speak, as neorealists and neoclassical realists believe. It is a political practice which needs to be contextualized and stripped of its purportedly neutral status. It must be understood with respect to its role in preserving and reproducing the structures and power relations present in all language forms. Dominant theories are, in this view, dominant discourses that shape our view of the world (the “subject”) and our ways of understanding it. Given my poststructuralist inclinations, I do not subscribe to the positivistic social scientific enterprise which aspires to test hypotheses against the “real world”. I therefore reject epistemological empiricism. Since epistemology is closely intertwined with methodology, especially with positivism, I eschew naturalism as a methodology. I study discourses and discursive practices that take shape in texts. This does not mean that there is no material world as such, only that it must be understood as mediated by language, which in the end means that it is always interpreted once framed by discourse (through the spoken word or in written form).2 “A discourse, then, is not a way of learning ‘about’ something out there in the ‘real world’; it is rather a way of producing that some- thing as real, as identifiable, classifiable, knowable, and therefore, meaningful. Discourse creates the conditions of knowing” (Klein quoted in George, 1994: 30). We consider “real” what we consider significant: a discourse is always an interpretation, a narrative of multiple realities inscribed in a specific social or symbolic order. Discursive representation is therefore not neutral; individuals in power are those who are “authorized” to produce “reality”, and therefore, knowledge. In this context, power is knowledge and the ability to produce that which is considered “true”. A realist discourse will produce the socio- linguistic conditions that will allow it to correspond, in theory as in practice, to “reality”. Evidently, this “reality” will be nothing but the “realist discourse” that one has constituted oneself. This is why, from a poststructuralist perspective, discourse may be considered as ontology3. Language is an autonomous system in which intertextuality makes many inter- pretations possible. Intertextuality, as Roland Barthes explains it, celebrates the “death of the author”: it is not the author who speaks, but the text, by referring to other texts, through the reader’s mind.4 The meaning of a text is thus enacted by the reader instead of being articulated passively in the text. Intertextuality assumes that a text can be read only in relation to other texts, as an “intertext”. The reader will read the text by virtually reinterpreting texts he already read in light of this new text. Such an intertextual approach thus allows endless interpretations and readings: “[...] as relevant as sources are, the list of unknowable sources that inform a reader’s interpretation of a text is what makes inter- textuality a powerful social and personal experience” (Porcel, 2002: 150). Intertextuality and deconstruction are used in a complementary way. “Decons- truction ‘is’ a way of reading a particular text, in which it is demonstrated that the ‘author’ fails to produce the logical, rational, construction of thought that was intended” (Brown, 1994: 1665). It is not a testable theory, nor a standard method; it is an ongoing ‘project’ (Butler, 2002: 28). It produces “stories”, not “theories”. In effect, in deconstruction, binary oppositions encoded in language and hierarchical antinomies hidden in discourse are revealed. It is thus assumed that the meaning of a concept can be revealed only in relation to at least one other term. Deconstructing American Hegemonic Realist Discourses5 [S]ecurity studies can be understood as a series of discursive practices that provided the policy coordination that went with incorporation into the U.S. political sphere (Dalby, 1997: 19). In explaining national security conduct, realist discourses serve the violent6 purposes of the state, as well as legitimizing its actions and reinforcing its hegemony. This is why we must historicize the practice of the analyst and question the “regimes of truth” constructed by realist discourses. When studying a given discourse, one must also study the socio-historical conditions in which it was produced. Realist analysts are part of the subfield of Strategic Studies associated with the Cold War era. Even though it faced numerous criticisms after the Cold War, especially since it proved irrelevant in predicting its end, this subfield retains a significant influence in International Relations – as evidenced, for instance, by the vitality of the journal International Security. Theoretically speaking, Strategic Studies is the field par excellence of realist analyses: it is a way of interpreting the world, which is inscribed in the language of violence, organized in strategy, in military planning, in a military order, and which seek to shape and preserve world order (Klein, 1994: 14). Since they are interested in issues of international order, realist discourses study the balancing and bandwagoning behavior of great powers. Realist analysts believe they can separate object from subject: on this view, it would be possible to abstract oneself from the world in which one lives and studies and to use value-free discourse to produce a non-normative analysis. As Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth assert, “[s]uch arguments [about American moderation and inter- national benevolence that stress the constraints on American power] are unpersuasive, however, because they fail to acknowledge the true nature of the current international system” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002: 31). Thus it would seem that Brooks and Wohlforth have the ability to “know” essential “truths”, as they “know” the “true” nature of the international system. From this vantage point it would even be possible “to set aside one’s own subjective biases and values and to confront the world on its own terms, with the hope of gaining mastery of that world through a clear understanding that transcends the limits of such personal determinants as one’s own values, class, gender, race, or emotions” (Klein, 1994: 16). However, it is impossible to speak or write from a neutral or transcendental ground: “there are only interpretations – some stronger and some weaker, to be sure – based on argument and evidence, which seems from the standpoint of the interpreter and his or her interlocutor to be ‘right’ or ‘accurate’ or ‘useful’ at the moment of interpretation” (Medhurst, 2000: 10). It is in such realist discourse that Strategic Studies become a technocratic approach determining the foundations of security policies that are disguised as an academic approach above all critical reflection (Klein, 1994: 27-28). Committed to an explanatory logic, realist analysts are less interested in the constitutive processes of states and state systems than in their functional existence, which they take as given. They are more attentive to regulation, through the military uses of force and strategic practices that establish the internal and external boundaries of the states system. Their main argument is that matters of security are the immutable driving forces of global politics. Indeed, most realists see some strategic lessons as being eternal, such as balance of power politics and the quest for national security. For Brooks and Wohlforth, balance of power politics (which was synonymous with Cold War politics in realist discourses) is the norm: “The result — balancing that is rhetorically grand but substan- tively weak — is politics as usual in a unipolar world” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002: 29). National security discourses constitute the “observed realities” that are the grist of neorealist and neoclassical realist theories. These theories rely upon U.S. material power (the perception of U.S. relative material power for neoclassical realists), balance of power, and the global distribution of power to explain and legitimate American national security conduct. Their argument is circular since they depict a reality that is constituted by their own discourse, in addition to legitimizing American strategic behavior. Realists often disagree about the use of force – on military restraint versus military intervention, for example – but the differences pertain to strategies of power, that is, means as opposed to ends. Realist discourses will not challenge the United States’ position as a prominent military power. As Barry Posen maintains, “[o]ne pillar of U.S. hegemony is the vast military power of the United States. [...] Observers of the actual capabilities that this effort produces can focus on a favorite aspect of U.S. superiority to make the point that the United States sits comfortably atop the military food chain, and is likely to remain there” (Posen, 2003: 7). Realist analysts “observe” that the U.S. is the world hegemonic power and that no other state can balance that power. In their analyses, they seek to explain how the United States was able to build and lead coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq with no other power capable of offering military resistance. Barry Posen “neutrally” explains this by em- phasizing the United States’ permanent preparation for war: I argue that the United States enjoys command of the commons—command of the sea, space, and air. I discuss how command of the commons supports a hegemonic grand strategy. [...] Command means that the United States gets vastly more military use out of the sea, space, and air than do others; that it can credibly threaten to deny their use to others; and that others would lose a military contest for the commons if they attempted to deny them to the United States. Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the U.S. global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power, including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the commons has permitted the United States to wage war on short notice even where it has had little permanent military presence. This was true of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the 1993 intervention in Somalia, and the 2001 action in Afghanistan (Posen, 2003: 7-9). Moreover, in realist theoretical discourses, transnational non-state actors such as terrorist networks are not yet taken into account. According to Brooks and Wohlforth, they need not be: “Today there is one pole in a system in which the population has trebled to nearly 200” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002: 29). In their system, only states are relevant. And what of the Al-Qaida terrorist network? At best, realist discourses accommodate an interstate framework, a “reality” depicted in their writings as an oversimplification of the complex world in which we now live (Kratochwil, 2000).7 In their theoretical constructs, these analysts do not address national or state identity in any substantive way. Moreover, they do not pay attention to the security culture in which they as individuals are embedded8. They rarely if ever acknowledge their subjectivity as analysts, and they proceed as if they were able to separate themselves from their cultural environment. From a poststructuralist perspective, however, it is impossible to recognize all the ways in which we have been shaped by the culture and environment in which we were raised. We can only think or experience the world through a cultural prism: it is impossible to abstract oneself from one’s interpretive cultural context and experience and describe “the world as it is”. There is always an interpretive dimension to knowledge, an inevitable mediation between the “real world” and its representation. This is why American realist analysts have trouble shedding the Cold War mentality in which they were immersed. Yet some scholars, like Brooks and Wohlforth, consciously want to perpetuate it: “Today the costs and dangers of the Cold War have faded into history, but they need to be kept in mind in order to assess unipolarity accurately” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002: 30). The Language of Realism(s) What is at issue is how to deal appropriately with always already being part of a reality that cannot be described or grasped other than through inter- pretations and in relation to our practices, which are at the same time constituting it (Maja Zehfuss, 2002: 255). Neorealist and neoclassical realism offer themselves up as a narrative of the world institutional order. Critical approaches must therefore seek to countermemorialize “those whose lives and voices have been variously silenced in the process of strategic practices” (Klein, 1994: 28). The problem, as revealed in the debate between gatekeepers of the subfield of Strategic Studies (Walt, 1991), is that those analyses that contravene the dominant discourse are deemed insignificant by virtue of their differing ontological and epistemological foundations. Approaches that deconstruct theoretical practices in order to disclose what is hidden in the use of concepts such as “national security” have something valuable to say. Their more reflexive and critically-inclined view illustrates how terms used in realist discourses, such as state, anarchy, world order, revolution in military affairs, and security dilemmas, are produced by a specific historical, geographical and socio-political context as well as historical forces and social relations of power (Klein, 1994: 22). Since realist analysts do not question their ontology and yet purport to provide a neutral and objective analysis of a given world order based on military power and interactions between the most important political units, namely states, realist discourses constitute a political act in defense of the state. Indeed, “[...] it is important to recognize that to employ a textualizing approach to social policy involving conflict and war is not to attempt to reduce social phenomena to various concrete manifestations of language. Rather, it is an attempt to analyze the interpretations governing policy thinking. And it is important to recognize that policy thinking is not unsituated” (Shapiro, 1989a: 71). Policy thinking is practical thinking since it imposes an analytic order on the “real world”, a world that only exists in the analysts’ own narratives. In this light, Barry Posen’s political role in legitimizing American hegemonic power and national security conduct seems obvious: U.S. command of the commons provides an impressive foundation for selective engagement. It is not adequate for a policy of primacy. [...] Command of the commons gives the United States a tremendous capability to harm others. Marrying that capability to a conservative policy of selective engagement helps make U.S. military power appear less threatening and more tolerable. Command of the commons creates additional collective goods for U.S. allies. These collective goods help connect U.S. military power to seemingly prosaic welfare concerns. U.S. military power underwrites world trade, travel, global telecommunications, and commercial remote sensing, which all depend on peace and order in the commons” (Posen, 2003: 44 and 46). Adopting a more critical stance, David Campbell points out that “[d]anger is not an objective condition. It (sic) is not a thing which exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. [...] Nothing is a risk in itself; [...] it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event” (Campbell, 1998: 1-2). In the same vein, national security discourse does not evaluate objective threats; rather, it is itself a product of historical processes and structures in the state and society that produces it. Whoever has the power to define security is then the one who has the authority to write legitimate security discourses and conduct the policies that legitimize them. The realist analysts and state leaders who invoke national security and act in its name are the same individuals who hold the power to securitize threats by inserting them in a discourse that frames national identity and freezes it.9 Like many concepts, realism is essentially contested. In a critical reinterpretation of realism, James Der Derian offers a genealogy of realism that deconstructs the uniform realism represented in IR: he reveals many other versions of realism that are never mentioned in International Relations texts (Der Derian, 1995: 367). I am aware that there are many realist discourses in International Relations, but they all share a set of assumptions, such as “the state is a rational unitary actor”, “the state is the main actor in international relations”, “states pursue power defined as a national interest”, and so on. I want to show that realism is one way of representing reality, not the reflection of reality. While my aim here is not to rehearse Der Derian’s genealogy of realism, I do want to spell out the problems with a positivist theory of realism and a correspondence philosophy of language. Such a philosophy accepts nominalism, wherein language as neutral description corresponds to reality. This is precisely the problem of epistemic realism and of the realism characteristic of American realist theoretical discourses. And since for poststructuralists language constitutes reality, a reinterpretation of realism as constructed in these discourses is called for.10 These scholars cannot refer to the “essentially contested nature of realism” and then use “realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon” (Der Derian, 1995: 374). Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that the many neorealist and neoclassical realist discourses in International Relations are not useful. Rather, I want to argue that these technicist and scientist forms of realism serve political purposes, used as they are in many think tanks and foreign policy bureaucracies to inform American political leaders. This is the relevance of deconstructing the uniform realism (as used in International Relations): it brings to light its locatedness in a hermeneutic circle in which it is unwittingly trapped (Der Derian, 1995: 371). And as Friedrich Kratochwil argues, “[...] the rejection of a correspondence theory of truth does not condemn us, as it is often maintained, to mere ‘relativism’ and/or to endless “deconstruction” in which anything goes but it leaves us with criteria that allows us to distinguish and evaluate competing theoretical creations” (Kratochwil, 2000 : 52). Given that political language is not a neutral medium that gives expression to ideas formed independently of structures of signification that sustain political action and thought, American realist discourses belonging to the neorealist or neoclassical realist traditions cannot be taken as mere descriptions of reality. We are trapped in the production of discourses in which national leaders and security speech acts emanating from realist discourses develop and reinforce a notion of national identity as synony- mous with national security. U.S. national security conduct should thus be understood through the prism of the theoretical discourses of American political leaders and realist scholars that co-constitute it. Realist discourses depict American political leaders acting in defense of national security, and political leaders act in the name of national security. In the end, what distinguishes realist discourses is that they depict the United States as having behaved like a national security state since World War II, while legitimating the idea that the United States should continue to do so. Political scientists and historians “are engaged in making (poesis), not merely recording or reporting” (Medhurst, 2000: 17). Precisely in this sense, rhetoric is not the description of national security conduct; it constitutes it. Writing the National Security State [F]rom the giddy days of the first and through the most morbid moments of the Second Cold War, the popular culture, journalism, and academic study of international intrigue has been an important inter- text of power and play in world politics. This intertext represents a field of ideological contestation where national security strategies, with their end- games of impossibly real wars of mass annihilation can be played and replayed for mass consumption as a simulation of war in which states compete, in- terests clash, and spy counters spy, all in significant fun (Der Derian, 1992: 41). It is difficult to trace the exact origins of the concept of “national security”. It seems however that its currency in policymaking circles corresponds to the American experience of the Second World War and of the early years of what came to be known as the “Cold War”. In this light, it is fair to say that the meaning of the American national security state is bound up with the Cold War context. If one is engaged in deciphering the meaning of the Cold War prism for American leaders, what matters is not uncovering the “reality” of the Cold War as such, but how, it conferred meaning and led people to act upon it as “reality”. The Cold War can thus be seen as a rhetorical construction, in which its rhetorical dimensions gave meaning to its material manifestations, such as the national security state apparatus. This is not to say that the Cold War never existed per se, nor does it “make [it] any less real or less significant for being rhetorical” (Medhurst, 2000: 6). As Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. stress, “political rhetoric creates political reality, structures belief systems, and provides the fundamental bases for decisions” (Hinds and Windt, cited in Medhurst, 2000: 6). In this sense, the Cold War ceases to be a historical period which meaning can be written permanently and becomes instead a struggle that is not context-specific and not geared towards one specific enemy. It is “an orientation towards difference in which those acting on behalf of an assumed but never fixed identity are tempted by the lure of otherness to interpret all dangers as fundamental threats which require the mobilization of a population” (Campbell, 2000: 227). Indeed, if the meaning of the Cold War is not context-specific, the concept of national security cannot be disconnected from what is known as the Cold War, since its very meaning(s) emerged within it (Rosenberg, 1993 : 277).11 If the American national security state is a given for realist analysts,12 it is important to ask whether we can conceive the United States during the Cold War as anything other than a national security state.13 To be clear, I am not suggesting that there is any such essentialized entity as a “national security state”.14 When I refer to the American national security state, I mean the representation of the American state in the early years of the Cold War, the spirit of which is embodied in the National Security Act of 1947 (Der Derian, 1992: 76). The term “national security state” designates both an institutionalization of a new governmental architecture designed to prepare the United States politically and militarily to face any foreign threat and the ideology – the discourse – that gave rise to as well as symbolized it. In other words, to understand the idea of a national security state, one needs to grasp the discursive power of national security in shaping the reality of the Cold War in both language and institutions (Rosenberg, 1993 : 281). A national security state feeds on threats as it channels all its efforts into meeting current and future military or security threats. The creation of the CIA, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council at the onset of the Cold War gave impetus to a state mentality geared to permanent preparedness for war. The construction of threats is thus essential to its well-being, making intelligence agencies privileged tools in accom- plishing this task. As American historian of U.S. foreign relations Michael Hogan observes in his study on the rise of the national security state during the Truman administration, “the national security ideology framed the Cold War discourse in a system of symbolic representation that defined America’s national identity by reference to the un-American ‘other,’ usually the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or some other totalitarian power” (Hogan, 1998: 17) Such a binary system made it difficult for any domestic dissent from U.S. policy to emerge – it would have “amounted to an act of disloyalty” (Hogan, 1998: 18).15 While Hogan distinguishes advocates from critics of the American national security state, his view takes for granted that there is a given and fixed American political culture that differs from the “new” national security ideology. It posits an “American way”, produced by its cultural, political, and historical experience. Although he stresses that differences between the two sides of the discourse are superficial, pertaining solely to the means, rather than the ends of the national security state, Hogan sees the national security state as a finished and legitimate state: an American state suited to the Cold War context of permanent war, while stopping short of a garrison state: Although government would grow larger, taxes would go up, and budget deficits would become a matter of routine, none of these and other transformations would add up to the crushing regime symbolized in the metaphor of the garrison state. The outcome instead would be an American national security state that was shaped as much by the country’s democratic political culture as it was by the perceived military imperatives of the Cold War (Hogan, 1998: 22). I disagree with this essentialist view of the state identity of the United States. The United States does not need to be a national security state. If it was and is still constructed as such by many realist discourses, it is because these discourses serve some political purpose. Moreover, in keeping with my poststructuralist inclinations, I maintain that identity need not be, and indeed never is, fixed. In a scheme in which “to say is to do”, that is, from a perspective that accepts the performativity of language, culture becomes a relational site where identity politics happens rather than being a substantive phenomenon. In this sense, culture is not simply a social context framing foreign policy decision-making. Culture is “a signifying part of the conditions of possibility for social being, [...] the way in which culturalist arguments themselves secure the identity of subjects in whose name they speak” (Campbell, 1998: 221). The Cold War national security culture represented in realist discourses was constitutive of the American national security state. There was certainly a conflation of theory and policy in the Cold War military-intellectual complex, which “were observers of, and active participants in, defining the meaning of the Cold War. They contributed to portray the enemy that both reflected and fueled predominant ideological strains within the American body politic. As scholarly partners in the national security state, they were instrumental in defining and disseminating a Cold War culture” (Rubin, 2001: 15). This national security culture was “a complex space where various representations and representatives of the national security state compete to draw the boundaries and dominate the murkier margins of international relations” (Der Derian, 1992: 41). The same Cold War security culture has been maintained by political practice (on the part of realist analysts and political leaders) through realist discourses in the post-9/11 era and once again reproduces the idea of a national security state. This (implicit) state identification is neither accidental nor inconsequential. From a poststructuralist vantage point, the identification process of the state and the nation is always a negative process for it is achieved by exclusion, violence, and margina- lization. Thus, a deconstruction of practices that constitute and consolidate state identity is necessary: the writing of the state must be revealed through the analysis of the discourses that constitute it. The state and the discourses that (re)constitute it thus frame its very identity and impose a fictitious “national unity” on society; it is from this fictive and arbitrary creation of the modernist dichotomous discourses of inside/outside that the discourses (re)constructing the state emerge. It is in the creation of a Self and an Other in which the state uses it monopolistic power of legitimate violence – a power socially constructed, following Max Weber’s work on the ethic of responsibility – to construct a threatening Other differentiated from the “unified” Self, the national society (the nation).16 It is through this very practice of normative statecraft,17 which produces threatening Others, that the international sphere comes into being. David Campbell adds that it is by constantly articulating danger through foreign policy that the state’s very conditions of existence are generated18. Rewriting the National Security State If realists are now easily caricatured, they have only themselves to blame. They had become caricatures by their own self-description. Realism, and parti- cularly its offshoot, strategic studies, helped make and was made by the Cold War (Booth, 1997: 92). Much of the Cold War state apparatus and military infrastructure remained in place to meet the challenges and threats of the post-Cold War era. If the attack on Pearl Harbor was the driving force of the postwar national security state apparatus (Stuart, 2003: 303), the 9/11 events have been used as a motive for resurrecting the national security discourse as a justification against a new ‘infamy’, global terrorism.19 Although in this study I am calling into question the political practices that legitimized the very idea of a national security state during the Cold War era, I find even more problematic the reproduction of a similar logic in the post-9/11 era – a rather different historical and socio-political context. As Simon Dalby highlights, Coupling fears of Soviet ambitions, of a repeat of Pearl Harbor, and of nuclear war, these institutions formed the heart of a semipermanent military mobilization to support the policies of containment militarism. If this context is no longer applicable, the case that the national security state is not an appropriate mode for social organization in the future is in many ways compelling. If security is pre- mised on violence, as security-dilemma and national-security literatures suggest (albeit often reluctantly), perhaps the necessity of rethinking global politics requires abandoning the term and the conceptual strictures that go with it (Dalby, 1997: 21). A recent article by David Jablonsky in the U.S. Army War College’s journal Para- meters illustrates such an un-problematized view of a Cold War-like attitude of casting for new enemies and threats, such as global terrorism, that can justify a state of permanent war (Luke, 2002: 10): In those early years of the Cold War, American leaders fashioned a grand strategic vision of the US role in the world, which while innovative in terms of changing concept of national security, did not outrun the experiences of the American people as the Soviet threat unfolded. US leaders face a similar challenge today as they seek to educate the public that the domestic terrorist threat to physical security should not be allowed to skew the American grand strategy of global engagement designed to further that core interest as well as those of economic prosperity and value promotion. [...] The new threat assures the continued existence if not growth of the national security state and will certainly cause increased centralization and intrusiveness of the US government. Nevertheless, the Cold War demonstrates that all this need not cause the rise of a garrison state or the diminishment of civil liberties (Jablonsky, 2003: 18). What puzzles me is that this viewpoint reflects an unquestioned normative statecraft practice that might be seen not only as possible but “wise”, since “we” all know that, in the end, the Cold War led to an “American triumph”... From a critical standpoint, national security discourse is constitutive of “social reality”: it is not neutral and it often serves to outfit state actions as objective responses to socio-political problems. U.S. state leaders now use this same discourse – the national security discourse – to wage a global war on ter- rorism. As Keith Shimko aptly points out, Times of war are no normal times. In addition to being periods of focused effort and all-out expenditure, ‘wartime’ might also be viewed as a period when some of the normal luxuries of life (e.g., material comfort or political liberties) are ‘sacrificed’ to the war effort. As a result, framing an issue as a war could lead to calls for restrictions on behavior and rights that are typically protected but come to be viewed as unaffordable luxuries during wartime (Shimko, 1995:79). The U.S. response to 9/11 is encapsulated as an armed struggle against a phantom enemy who replicates the tactics used in guerrilla wars in its capacity to strike any time, anywhere. The enemy is thus constructed as being both everywhere and nowhere, which allows state leaders to enact a security discourse of an Other against whom the U.S. must be protected as a legitimate and necessary one at the expense of some civil rights (e.g., colour tags for travellers and fingerprint biometric sensors in passports). A “state of war” is indeed incorporated into American political life : “For a society committed to armed struggle, there is little distinction between military and civilian life. ‘The cause’ becomes everything, justifying extraordinary measures, demanding larger-than-life sacrifices. Ordinary life is recruited into the ruthless binary that frames the struggle [...]. There is no room for a loyal opposition; to question is to betray” (Milner, Krishna, and Ferguson, 2001). In the context of a global war on terrorism, every citizen may become a “terrorist”. As Ronnie Lipschutz argues in After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century, “[a]ll individuals, whether citizen or permanent resident, whether legal or illegal, become potential threats to state security” (Lipschtuz, 2000: 51). Surprisingly, not many American citizens contested or protested such undemocratic limitations on civil liberties. Why is that so? One possible answer is that a great many are convinced that such measures will not be applied to them and that their own rights and freedoms will not be threatened. They seem to believe that since they are not doing anything wrong, they are protected. Accordingly, they think that those whose privacy and rights are being violated have done 19 20 something wrong and that they deserve it. As Iris Marion Young explains, this is where they err, for “[t]he move from a relatively free society to one over which the state exercises authoritarian domination often occurs by means of just this logic: citizens do not realize how easily they may find themselves under suspicion by authorities over whose decisions there is no public scrutiny” (Young, 2003: 12). When societal and individual security is considered, the national security discourse produces more insecurity than security.20 We must therefore question state practices that threaten individuals, rendering the state a source of insecurity for its citizens : “[I]nsecurity, rather than being external to the object to which it presents a threat is both implicated in and an effect of the very process of establishing and re-establishing the object’s identity” (Jutta Weldes, cited in Willey, 2002 : 29). National insecurity is thus revealed as the clear antonym of national security (Rosenberg, 1993 : 281 ; Der Derian, 1992: 75). Linguistically, “national insecurity” corresponds to the female and weak side of Cold War discourses (Tickner, 2001: 52 ; Peterson, 1992: 32). In effect, as Emily Rosenberg correctly observes, the power of national security linguistically comes from this binary opposition, where national security is empowered as representing a “strong emotive and symbolic power” inscribed in the male national security statist discourse (Rosenberg, 1993: 281). The national security state thus functions as a protection racket. Consequently, whether looking inward or outward, it must be rejected for its very discourse necessarily entails the unequal logic of protector- protected (Young, 2003: 14-15, 21). To understand American hegemonic power then is to understand how the theoretical foundations of U.S. hegemony influence the way U.S. leaders think about international politics generally and U.S. foreign policy in particular. As Marysia Zalewski points out, “[...] events in the world, issues in international politics, are not ontologically prior to our theories about them. This does not mean that people read about, say realism, and act accordingly, but that our (and by ‘our’ I mean theoriser/ global actors) dominant ways of thinking and acting in the world will be (re)produced as ‘reality’” (Zalewski, 1996: 350-51). The 9/11 attacks and the presence of a diffuse and transnational terrorist threat has convinced American state leaders that threats may come from within as well as from abroad. In a Cold War-like national security mindset, separating domestic from international politics was “business as usual”: it required paying attention to foreign and external threats. With a homeland security focus, the “boundaries” of the national security state are exploding inwardly. The “enemy” is not a foreign Other anymore; he may be American or he may strike on American soil. As Donald Pease puts it, “Overall, 9/11 brought to the light of day the Other to the normative representation of the United States. It positioned unheimlich dislocatees within the Homeland in place of the citizens who exercised rights and liberties on the basis of these normalizations. When the signifier of the Homeland substituted for the Virgin Land, the national security state was supplanted by the global state of emergency” (Pease, 2003: 17). The Other has become an undefined terrorist, with no specific territorial base. Just as Soviet communists were represented as barbaric, amoral, and inhuman, so is today’s terrorist. Conclusion [B]ecause invoking security is a political act and the discourses that construct dangers and endan- gered subjects are far from natural or neutral reflections of an independent reality, the larger social and political contexts within such discourses are invoked should also be given analytical attention (Dalby, 2002: XXI). In this piece, I have sought to explain how (American) realist theoretical discourses are mainly representative of the American experience of the Cold War. I have treated these historically-based discourses as political practices that frame and reproduce a national security state identity for the United States in the post-9/11 era. It is not the “reality” of the United States as a state that is cast in question by poststructuralists, but rather the way it is written as an unchanging and essentialized entity, as a national security state identity. Indeed, a state is always in the process of (re)construction; its identity is never fixed, nor is its legitimacy uncontested. As Campbell puts it, “with no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to be) always in a process of becoming” (Campbell, 1998: 12). The poststructuralist approach adopted here made it possible to reveal the normative issues arising in such discourses. In sum, to understand how American or American-based realist discourses facilitated the social construction of a Cold War with the USSR after World War II, one must understand the security culture that allowed for the development of political practices that ushered in the institutionalization of a national security state. On a more metatheoretical level, in International Relations, the poststructuralist/ postmodernist turn has made mainstream positivist scholars fear a lapse into complete relativism. As Christopher Butler points out, “Postmodernist relativism needn’t meant that anything goes. [...] What it does mean is that we should be more sceptically aware, more relativist about, more attentive to, the theoretical assumptions which support the narratives produced by all [scholars] (in the original quote, Butler wrote “historians” for he was addressing historians), whether they see themselves as empiricists or deconstructors or as postmodernist ‘new historicists’” (Butler, 2002: 35). It is increasingly clear that realists of all guises in International Relations are more and more reluctant to take an inflexible position with respect to the ontological and epistemological assumptions underpinning the discipline. However, in viewing theory as practice, we recognize that our choices have a normative and political value which allows us to distinguish the important from the incidental. As a result, what people see as the “real world” is implicitly bound up with the epistemological, methodological and ontological stance they take in theoretical discourse. If the national security discourse that made the Cold War possible – in American realist discourses at least – is (re)applied to our own era, then a similar pattern of legitimizing and constituting a national security state will be reproduced.

### Predictable and fair – they choice their method they should defend it

### Education – the roll of the scholar is to question methodology first – securitized methodology is unethical (because it prevents solvency of structural violence by constructing military threats that must be addressed)

Shampa Biswas 7 Prof of Politics @ Whitman “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist” Millennium 36 (1) p. 117-125

The recent resuscitation of the project of Empire should give International Relations scholars particular pause.1 For a discipline long premised on a triumphant Westphalian sovereignty, there should be something remarkable about the ease with which the case for brute force, regime change and empire-building is being formulated in widespread commentary spanning the political spectrum. Writing after the 1991 Gulf War, Edward Said notes the US hesitance to use the word ‘empire’ despite its long imperial history.2 This hesitance too is increasingly under attack as even self-designated liberal commentators such as Michael Ignatieff urge the US to overcome its unease with the ‘e-word’ and selfconsciously don the mantle of imperial power, contravening the limits of sovereign authority and remaking the world in its universalist image of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.3 Rashid Khalidi has argued that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq does indeed mark a new stage in American world hegemony, replacing the indirect and proxy forms of Cold War domination with a regime much more reminiscent of European colonial empires in the Middle East.4 The ease with which a defence of empire has been mounted and a colonial project so unabashedly resurrected makes this a particularly opportune, if not necessary, moment, as scholars of ‘the global’, to take stock of our disciplinary complicities with power, to account for colonialist imaginaries that are lodged at the heart of a discipline ostensibly interested in power but perhaps far too deluded by the formal equality of state sovereignty and overly concerned with security and order. Perhaps more than any other scholar, Edward Said’s groundbreaking work in Orientalism has argued and demonstrated the long and deep complicity of academic scholarship with colonial domination.5 In addition to spawning whole new areas of scholarship such as postcolonial studies, Said’s writings have had considerable influence in his own discipline of comparative literature but also in such varied disciplines as anthropology, geography and history, all of which have taken serious and sustained stock of their own participation in imperial projects and in fact regrouped around that consciousness in a way that has simply not happened with International Relations.6 It has been 30 years since Stanley Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make any universal claims,7 yet there seems to be a curious amnesia and lack of curiosity about the political history of the discipline, and in particular its own complicities in the production of empire.8 Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced, resurrected and re-energised is a question that should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine the contours of global power. Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence render questionable the disciplinary traps that have, ironically, circumscribed the ability of scholars whose very business it is to think about global politics to actually think globally and politically. What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an ‘amateur’, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking ‘truth to power’ and self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking politics seriously. Second, I turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the global seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about feeling and thinking globally concretely, thoroughly and carefully. IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’ to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’ One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing, minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power play on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13 While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis can simply not be raised. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21

### The impact to framework is they must defend their entire method and don’t get the permutation

### Reject the argument not the team

## PERM

## 2NC – A2 – Perm Do Both

### Nothing to permute – the alternative rejects the frame of the 1AC – only after a new vision of IR is created can policy be crafted – that’s Cheesman

### Permutation fails – it prescribes policy prescriptions and then reflects on them – questioning orthodox prescriptions first is necessary to cope with the complexities of IR

## 2NC – Heg – Wins Us The Debate

DAVID GRONDIN University of Ottawa, Canada, 2006, “Hegemony or Empire? The Redefinition of US Power under George W. Bush”, P. 6-22, KENTUCKY

[O]ur political imagination has been restricted by our uncritical acceptance of our own rhetorical construction of democracy, a construction that privileges free-enterprise capitalism and republicanism. Such a construction – limiting, as it does, our ability to understand both ourselves and others – needs to be rhetorically reconstructed to serve the needs of globalism as different nations struggle toward their own definitions, policies, and practices. The first step in such a rhetorical reconstruction is to become aware of our own language choices and the narratives and assumptions embedded in these choices.1 There is not a day that goes without American power being addressed or discussed in one way or another in the global media. Indeed, over the past five years, no subject has been more studied or discussed in world politics than the sheer extent of American power as imperialism, empire or hegemony, sometimes as praise but most frequently as resentment. A number of recent commentators and analysts have in fact noted the possibility of an imperialist turn in the conceptualization and prosecution of US foreign policy. Hence, several discussions of an ‘American Empire’ and a ‘Pax Americana’ have garnished the political spectrum of many opinion-editorial pages of major papers across the globe, especially in the aftermath of the swift US military ‘victory’ in the 2003 Iraqi War. Sadly, in many cases, one can say that the emperor has been stripped of his clothes – and most of the time he was not even an emperor. The use of the term ‘empire’ has been a shortcut for any form of critique of US foreign policy at large since September 11, 2001, prior to the concept being discussed in a rigorous or serious way. In these instances, the galvanized epithet appears in itself as superfluous for the harsh criticism would have been levelled at the US no matter what. One could put forth the idea that the US could be construed as an ‘informal empire’, a recurrent term in the literature on American imperialism. A fortiori, it sure possesses some analytical power, as it takes into account the importance of rules, norms and institutions. However, for many theorists, this dynamic would be better served by the term ‘hegemony’, which has the capacity to encompass both the Gramscian concept of consensus and persuasion as well as the classical view that highlights the role of military power and coercion in the evolution of US foreign policy. This view is mostly associated with the work of John Ikenberry, Daniel Deudney, Andrew Hurrell and John Agnew. These scholars argue that ‘it is analytically more useful to understand the United States as a hegemonic rather than an imperial power’, especially since hegemony would be cast as being less an ‘intrusive mode of control’ than empire.2 In fact, there is much leverage in this view that shall make it more compelling and attractive as a policy-oriented research agenda. All the more reason that most of the authors in this book implicitly or explicitly tackle the concept of US hegemony more than they take issue with empire. Perhaps it is John Agnew who put it best: ‘Which word – empire or hegemony – best describes the role of the US in contemporary world politics? If it is an empire, it is a peculiarly incoherent and increasingly hollow one. It is better seen as increasingly subject to pressures from the very hegemony it has released on the world.’3 That being said, if it makes more sense to use the concept of hegemony to understand how American power works in contemporary world politics, does it mean that if one considers American power in longue durée, by situating the rise of the US as a regional and then global power and by putting it in a broad historical context, empire and imperialism become more relevant concepts? Even so, there would still be nominal issues to consider. The might of American power is so strong and extensive that it is impossible for any actor/agent of world politics not to feel threatened or beleaguered by the ‘success story of the United States’ as a nation-state. One cannot help but notice how sentiments of anti-Americanism have been expressed in several places where they could not have been thought possible or at an intensity never before reached. Some say that America’s ‘soft power’ and its cultural appeal are decreasing and that the US is, ‘again’, on a declining curve. No matter what name American power has been given, whether it is empire, imperialism or hegemony, one must take a step back and reassess the exercise and representation of American power as well as its perception since George W. Bush took office. Today’s American hegemony/empire is more powerful than at any time in history. Yet it is under constant and even growing challenges in several spheres and ways. What has become of the US as the ‘beacon on the hill’? According to the exceptionalist narrative, the United States has been anything but an empire. Therefore, it could, would and shall never be compared to other empires in history, present or past. This was and still is the essential leitmotiv behind an ‘American exceptionalism’. Is it so far disconnected from its original ‘covenant’ as to bear no possible mention of its liberal and enlightened roots? Furthermore, has it come to a point that US nationalist expansion has become a sham (and shameful) quest for power? This book is most certainly as much a study of American nationalism, hegemony and imperialism as it is of US sovereignty and state-building experiences. America as a Place – and a Nation-State The modern ‘system of territorial division’, of territorializations, made national states the primary locus of political, economic and cultural organization. This is the result of cartography, where territorial representation exists as a mental or illustrated map. With mapping, one proceeds to the reterritorialization of the world, as the state invests – reconstructs – ‘its nation and people with new meaning’. Therefore, remapping participates in ‘the fragmentation of the map of the contemporary world’ through cartography.4 Indeed, ‘[t]he undoubted success of the United States as a political-economic and cultural enterprise over the long term should not blind us to the limitations of the official story’.5 When considering US global power, the resulting map is necessarily an approximation, an interpretation and a codification of reality. The globe in its entire cartographic representation is of interest to the US, because it has global power, responsibilities and interests. This is why, in the study of US power and of its redefinition, one needs to study both the US in its national context and abroad. But for that to happen, a dominant discourse writing the nation must be assessed for the United States of America. ‘[T]he national space of the United States is politically stabilized and homogenized through a dominant story, [...] [which] story is then widely accepted as a true account of the ways things operate, irrespective of empirical observations to the contrary.’6 Maps shape a world that in turn shapes its maps: it is a recursive social process that renders modern cartographical practices epistemologically linked to the inscription of the nation/state in the spatial abstraction that embodied it and the territorial description that associated it with a national identity. The first part of this book is interested in one such particular ‘state-space’, that of the United States of America. We are thus interested in the narratives that construct the US as it exists as a political entity in its dominant story of a unified United States of America. When we look at the space (space as controlled or commanded) of the United States in today’s world order, it is as if we were looking down on the United States territory and people as outside ‘observers’. This top-down approach construes space as an area where a collective entity is ‘held together’ in popular consciousness by a map-image and a narrative or story that represents it as a meaningful whole; it is as if ‘powerful actors [were] imposing their control and stories on others’.7 However, when we look at its place, it is as if we were going from bottom-up, looking at the peoples. In considering global politics, because people matter, ‘[p]lace signifies their encounter with one another in the material reality (environment) that is construed as “space”’.8 It refers to how everyday life is inscribed in space and takes on meaning for specified groups of people or organizations. Admittedly, ‘[t]he United States government can change entirely from decade to decade, but the need to make Americans, out of a land called America, continues in new and unexpected forms.’9 American historian of the ‘frontier experience’ Richard Slotkin writes that ‘so long as the nation-state remains the prevalent form of social organization, something like a national myth/ideology will be essential to its operation’.10 We are told that ‘America was constituted in the space between law and outlawry, between legitimacy and rebellion, between the immediacy of the spoken word and the endurance of the written text. America is a nation where “law is king,” yet the Americans are also “a people who think lightly of the laws”.’11 This constitutive contradiction marks the law as an axis in the structure of American identity. Contradictions are by all means at the core of American national identity as an ‘empire of liberty’. One needs to assess the tensions of the actual United States with the ideal(ized) ‘first new nation’ that we find inscribed in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. It is this representational force of the Constitution over Americans, of the ‘Homeland as a text’, that allows Americans to compare their existence in the world as ‘Americans’ to their ideal existence written for eternity in the Constitution: Interpretation of the Constitution is thus an ambivalent communion, coupling the people and the text, the material and the ideal, aspiration and experience. In it the people recognize their ambivalent constitution between word and flesh. In it the people recall their authority. [...] Because it acknowledges the people as author of a text they know to have authored them, it invites them to recognize the dialectical nature of constitution. Because they are written into the text, as much in the name of the thing as in its content, it invites them to confirm that writing in the act and the acknowledgement of interpretation as a constitutional activity. It obliges them to be critical if they would be obedient, to comprehend the text if they are to be comprehended within it.12 Why is it so pregnant in American political culture to represent the US as the ‘first new nation’, as a ‘revolutionary yet civilized’ colonization as if it had had a ‘clean break’ from history?13 Above all, in studying American expansionism in the post–World War II period, but especially since the end of the Cold War, one major concern of this book is that one does not need to adhere to or reassess American exceptionalism, which has been ruled out by numerous and rigorous historical studies of Early American history, of political theory, and of studies of American political development, even though it has never been able to reach a consensus in any of these aforementioned fields14. It does not mean however that one does not taken into account American exceptionalism. Why Not Address American National Experience as an Empire? As stated previously, this book does not share common views on the use of the terms ‘empire’ and ‘hegemony’ to refer to the United States’ power, at least since WWII. However, what is more consensual is that there were US imperialist experiences at the turn of the 20th century in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, among other places. Whether these experiences are limited in time and bear influences on actual US practices does not prevent us from addressing the empire as part of the American state experience. As will be seen in the individual chapters, where one starts and assesses American imperialism and hegemony is a matter of contention and debate. But it is nevertheless a custodial concern of this book that all agree that the US was once an empire. For some, it may have been an empire in spirit or in the making, as it was foundationally presented as an ‘empire of liberty’ by Thomas Jefferson. However, the mere facts that there is so much talk of a (re)turn to imperialism serves as proof of contested views on experiences of American imperialism. For Stefan Heumann, when applied to the United States, ‘The concept of empire transcends the disciplinary boundaries between foreign and domestic politics ... [because] domestic liberal institutions have to cope with imperial policies which originated from the encounter with the foreign.’15 This imperial encounter in fact goes at the heart of a related and often belated theme, that of colonialism.16 In effect, the first concept one encounters when dealing with imperialism is that of colonialism (and now neo-colonialism). The problem most frequently encountered is taking colonialism for imperialism. In many instances imperialism is used as a synonym for colonialism, as if one were politically better than the other. If imperialism sure goes with colonialism, we should at least strive to nuance what colonialism was in conjunction with imperialism by refining the use of imperialism in such context. The generalization of imperialism over the theoretical span is unhelpful. For one thing, the US experience with imperialism was not the same everywhere. With most of Latin American countries, it tended to be more an informal imperialism, that is, the exercise of control by one sovereign state over another or others through various diplomatic, economic, political or military means and strategies. But in the Philippines, for instance, it did not materialize this way. Imperialism there turned into colonialism, for the Philippines became ruled by an apparatus constructed by the US and the US acted as an overseas colonial empire. Colonialism here is thus formal imperialism in contrast to the Latin American guise of American imperialism; it ‘involves the explicit and often legally codified establishment of direct political domination over a foreign territory and peoples’.17 The same went for Puerto Rico in 1898.18 As it is widely known there were debates, even fierce ones, over whether the US should follow the example of other European imperial powers by annexing the islands of the Philippines, Guam, Samoa, Puerto Rico, and on ascertaining formal colonial rule over overseas people.19 What is certain, though, as historian Michael Adas relates, is that the first two governors of the Philippines that were sent by the US government in the newly created colonies of the Philippines of the American empire, William H. Taft and Luke Wright, viewed the British experience of colonization as ‘the most obvious models for United States colonial policy’.20 However, one must point out that in their minds a true sense of exceptionalism and manifest destiny was reactivated, as US colonial rule policy was seen as part of a civilizing process and missions that should aim at an ‘an alternate regeneration’ of the Philippines in America’s image. There were frequent ‘claims of exceptionalism grounded in misreadings of the colonial history of America’s rivals, or in rather blinkered assessments of both the domestic situation in the US and the nature of colonial society in the Philippines’.21 Most American stories were silent about the segregationist, paternalistic and racist influences in the US elite thinking. Indeed, American official discourse saw its colonial governing practices as distinctive and upscale when compared with European colonialisms. This exceptionalist thinking may owe a great deal to that teleological narrative ‘that encompassed the history of the rise of the United States from an oppressed colony in its own right to its newly claimed positions as a global power’.22 No matter how inaccurate it is in its representation of imperialist and neo-colonial practices of the US, this powerful narrative helps us understand how the whole civilizing mission in the Philippines took the form of an ideology of modernization and liberation of the rest of humanity in the height of the Cold War23 and why it took a long time before being able to reinsert talks of American imperialism and empire in public discourse in the US. The Study of American Imperialism/Empire Any incursion in the study of imperialism comes with great pain for there are so many concepts to juggle with before even starting the analysis. This even gets harder when addressing US imperialism and its (un)likely empire. What are we dealing with when assessing the US as an empire? As historian Anders Stephanson stresses, the term has descriptive value: That the United States does indeed possess a colonial empire overseas, whose aquatic area are equals that of the lower forty-eight lower states, may be a descriptive proposition; but it is also an interesting fact that demands exploration and explanation. Empire on that view signifies nothing but a legal and political form, and sometimes, with all the proper caveats, it is illuminating to describe a system as an empire. What is particularly interesting about the US variety is the obvious anomaly: persisting, formal inferiority within a liberal framework, an official anti-colonialism that both recognizes and manages not to recognize the colonial fact.24 How must we interpret the colonial appendages of the US? Do they fall within the parameters of imperialism? The denial – and absence – of an imperial structure does in fact render any question of an American empire somewhat problematic. Do we factor in the intent or the results? In this respect, what may qualify as an American empire? With the exception of Puerto Rico, Guam, the US Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands and American Samoa, now that (most) US colonies are independent, some make the compelling argument that to talk of American imperialism one must do it in a classical sense, that is, as European imperialism, and must limit its analysis to 1898 and its immediate aftermath, thus to what is constructed as ‘America’s imperialist moment’ which is now said to ‘[have] come and gone’.25 To be sure, there may be some value to this line of argument. Imperialism is such an imbued concept that one always needs to know precisely how it is being used. One may even wonder whether the term has lost all relevant meaningful uses. For quite a long time, only the New Left historians of the 1960s, who argued along Marxist lines, and other Marxist theorists believed that the US had been an imperialist power since at least the 1870s (or even from its very birth). Yet this empire was not seen, with the exception of some specific cases (the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Cuba, among others), as a European-style colonialist empire, but rather as an informal economic empire – a capitalist power – interested in offshore markets, in Asia and China especially. Until recently, our understanding of the history and development of American power/hegemony was based on a conceptual definition that excluded empires because the US was constructed as being so exceptional that it was impossible to compare it with other empires. Numerous Cold War historians, as well as International Relations (IR) scholars, that have now taken a more historical-materialist approach have suggested that considering the US as an empire through the use of the literature on globalization would provide some better historical and conceptual bases for both areas of thought, as well as providing some insight for the overall context of the present imperial discourse. Furthermore, combining an American empire with globalization could give us a more historicized version of globalization, and one that firmly brings power back into the equation, instead of taking globalization as a neutral and/or natural phenomenon.26 It could also give a more adequate concept of the place of the US in the contemporary international system, and some basis for comparison with the past. This historical sociology argument thus makes bringing the US as an empire back into the IR discourse even more relevant, even if it may still be rejected afterwards. In truth, when comparing the United States with other empires one must not forget the context of global capitalism, and especially of globalization. Another thing to be aware of is that in so doing, in comparing US imperialism with other imperialisms from the 19th century onwards, the role of world order producer of the United States in the prevalent globalized neoliberal hegemony must be accounted for. In many respects, there seems to be intricate relations to be deciphered from the nexus of globalization, security and hegemony/empire that characterizes American power in our time. In effect, the identity politics of the US could diminish the added value of comparative historical analysis. As asserts Martin Coward, ‘Often this has been in the unhelpful form of generalisations drawing upon models of imperialism that were designed to explain the colonialist expansion of capitalism in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. And yet it is clear that such models are poorly suited to the analysis of American power in the early twenty-first century – not least because America has always insisted, in its self identity, that it is an anti-imperial, anti-colonial power.’27 Drawing on the recent literature on a ‘new American imperialism/empire’, it would consequently become possible to undertake a critique of the new-found US imperial hegemony by way of taking cues from Hardt and Negri’s Empire as a deterritorialized and borderless entity.28 Entering the terrain of this Empire could indeed prove to be a good intellectual strategy if one wishes to understand the complexities of the networks of command and power relations at play in the reordering of global politics that has generally been subsumed under the title of ‘globalization’.29 US Liberalism and Exceptionalism Is US global dominance or its quest a call to empire? If not, why has the language of empire had such a ‘new beginning’ recently? As nicely put by the mainstream of American foreign policy ideologies, but especially by its arch-type, John Mearsheimer, the United States as hegemon may pursue a liberal world order, but must often do so through illiberal means. So this idea of a liberal empire brings back the issue of what liberalism is (American-style), and what recent US attempts are at reshaping the world order to its liking. And as Amy Kaplan puts it, ‘In a dramatic turn away from the disavowal of its own imperial history, the embrace of empire across the political spectrum celebrates and normalizes US global dominance as an inevitable process. The notion of the homeland, with its nativist connotations, works to protect a sense of domestic insularity, always under attack yet cordoned off from the threatening outside world. While mainstream discourse places the homeland and the empire in separate spheres ... isolationism and internationalism in US policy today are two sides of the same imperial coin’, as are American exceptionalism and universalism.30 American exceptionalism and the manifest destiny image are at the heart of any understanding of US imperialism/empire. The whole liberal imagination that so deeply characterizes the US – and that is mainly indebted to Louis Hartz’s intellectual legacy in the American social sciences31 – most assuredly accounts for the contradictions within the American republic, discarding the very idea of empire. The constant re-articulation of the ideal of the US as ‘an empire of liberty’ leaves no place for an American empire, even though it seems undisputable. If we understand US nationalist power and the project of an American liberal Republic as a different form of imperialism, it may become possible to address this issue of hegemony/empire without having to face the usual oppositions from Americans themselves and American academics especially. It may decidedly be one way to reappraise neoconservatism within the ideological web that renders it intelligible, that of American liberalism, for it helps us make sense of the discourse of a new American empire/imperialism. As Anne Norton explains, ‘Liberalism has become the common sense of the American people, a set of principles unconsciously adhered to, a set of conventions so deeply held that they appear (when they appear at all) to be no more than common sense. The capacity of liberalism to transform itself in America from ideology to common sense is the proof – as it is the means – of its constitutional power.’32 American liberalism has evolved as the ‘peculiar fusion of providential and republican ideology that took place after the Revolution’ and stands as the civil and political religion that animates the powerful ‘master narrative’ of a manifest destiny, whereas liberalism becomes a ‘manner of interpreting the space and time of “America”’.33 Therein lays a unification of a sacred and secular conception of liberty, of a providential mission and sense of moral crusade that would identify ‘America’ and guide its action in the world. America’s peculiar situation had in many respects made it an object of universal interest.34 In effect, the ideology of (American) liberalism goes even deeper: the presumption that liberal values are self-evidently true underscores the possibility that other societies could be more like America in practice given the proper incentives or tutelage.

 Hence the familiar spectacle of American presidents making appearances in foreign countries and pressing those countries to enact such liberal social institutions as a free market economy, the separation of church and state, and increased freedom of the press. While non-Americans resent such actions, in the United States, they are usually seen as the simple reaffirmation of things that Americans know to be true. America imagines the rest of the world as somehow, at base, just like America – if not for the distortion produced by ideology, corrupt regimes, and the historical effects of culture.35 It is in this American liberal ideological discourse that America acquires the status of a universal symbol for its values and its democratic system. The metaphorical global war on terror waged in the name of liberty and civilization delves into the same logic: ‘To say that by attacking the United States the terrorists attacked the world is to suggest that America is the world – or, at least, is what the rest of the world aspires to become.’36 As stated by many scholars of American nationalism, the Bush administration’s ambitious vision for America’s role in the world is reminiscent of earlier moralistic statements of the antebellum period in US political history.37 The post-9/11 era allowed it to reinvigorate the national security discourse with its manifest destiny and a sense of its exceptionalist mission of democratizing the world. Revealed most importantly by the neoconservative guise of US nationalism and liberal ideology, the Global War on Terror has been fuelled by an extremely vibrant and patriotic nationalist base that truly believes that America is invested with a providential mission and sense of moral crusade. This emanates from what Daniel Nexon and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson call the ‘liberal imagination’ in American political life, a powerful identity and ideological narrative in the American discourse on foreign policy which makes them overtly moralistic. It is often used to conflate the US and the world in the protection of liberal democracy and liberty.38 It is however known that the suffusion of liberal values and ascription of a divine mission for the world bring about contradictions when confronted with some of the foreign policy actions of the United States. But this is of no concern for US nationalism; it is committed to an ‘ideological construction of the nation that insists on the global relevance of the American project’ and consequently claims ‘its righteous entitlement to lead the world’.39 This remapping of US nationalism is thus to be understood through a dialectical relationship of exceptionalism/universalism, and of a ‘city upon a hill’/ crusader state. It is in this framing of US globalist nationalism that its neoliberal hegemonic global strategy tries to have it both ways, to remake the world in America’s image, while assuming that its national interests are global interests, thereby conflating its national security with global security, as if the great aspirations of the US and of mankind were one and the same. In this light, the US–led Global War on Terror really becomes a nation-building project that has evolved into sort of a ‘Global Leviathan’, without its mandatory ‘social contract’ with the peoples of the world.40 Neoliberal Geopolitics as American Hegemony – and Informal Imperialism All the fuss with empire/hegemony would not be as present and overwhelming if it were not for the neoconservative influence in the Bush administration. Does speaking of an American empire help us understand the reworking and transformations of American power that resulted from the Bush doctrine and the rising influence of neoconservatism in American politics? Maybe so, maybe not, but the imperial trope has been reactivated by self-declared neoconservatives and, on their own did they couch an argument for a better and stronger America in a ‘New Rome’ project, a Pax Americana for the 21st century.41 Therefore, saying that things have changed since George W. Bush took office is a truism. We now need to consider the neoconservative fantasies of empire.42 Moreover, it is happening in a country where the orthodox discourse has always maintained that there was no such thing as an American Empire. However, if some would like to make us believe that there is such a clashin US foreign policy community that we might speak of a ‘revolution in foreign policy’,43 in many ways it could rather be cast as an evolution, if not an extension of the long-standing neoliberal global strategy set forth for the 1945 post-war era and established within the Cold War’s epithet, the ‘national security state’.44 In highlighting a continuous trend, this does not mean that one believes that a rational project of a clear and well-designed foreign policy has been animating and driving US decision makers from 1945 onwards, but rather that there is some form of consensus on what US national interests and its national security objectives are (amongst decision makers and political and business elites). The conditions within which these objectives are put forth have changed, but the main principles of the strategy have not. Anyone interested in understanding the principles of neoliberal hegemony in US national security conduct since WWII cannot see the Bush foreign policy as a historical anomaly. In this very sense, one may say that the Bush doctrine represents an extreme version of the logic of US national security since WWII.45 For neoconservatives, this military supremacy serves the interests of preserving the long-established hegemony. Even if the 2003 Iraqi War was not a public diplomatic success when we factor in the failure of the Bush administration to persuade a wide international audience of the legitimacy of its policies, there continues to be wide support for the promise of American values and ideals abroad.46 At no point did neoconservatives reject the Cold War strategy, as their target was always the Clinton administration, which they usually criticize for having failed on capitalizing on the ‘peace dividends’ of the fall of communism at the end of the Cold War and for letting new challenges and threats emerge. Maybe it is differences that matter most, but it remains to be seen whether the neoconservatives were so revolutionary as to change US global strategy to bring its long-held hegemony to the ground. In contrast to what many observers and theoreticians assert, it still consists of a mix of a realism associated with fighting a ‘foreign’ threat (from Soviet communism to global terrorism), of a liberalism associated with financial international institutions and multilateral institutions such as the UN and NATO, and a commitment to free market ideology and the promotion of democracy. Today’s American global strategy still refers to the US neoliberal hegemony established after 1945. In that regard, the discourse of a benign American hegemony and its associated neoliberal values of free market, freedom and democracy remain powerful ideas outside the United States. As political geographer Matthew Sparke argues, the differences in foreign policy are not as far off as is alleged by both sides and should probably rather be seen as two opposite sides of a coin: ‘If we instead see the war planning and resulting talk as a complicit mix of geopolitical affect and geoeconomic assumptions, such contradictions becomes comprehensible as the contradictions of an informal American imperialism being pushed in the direction of formality and force amid globalized capitalist interdependency.’47 If one chooses to speak of American unipolarity and interprets American military global power as ‘one of the great realities of our age’ and as a producer of world order, indeed in going as far as to say that ‘never before has one country been so powerful or unrivaled’,48 what prevents a person from acknowledging an American empire/imperialism? For such a person, John Ikenberry for instance, it is the kind of world order sought in principle by the US that prevents any mention of ‘imperialism’. The mere mention of empire as applied to what he sees as hegemonic power from the US comes as a cursory and sketchy rendering. For them, it makes no sense not to refer to our current era as unipolar and any talk that interprets it as being imperial for one ‘[sees] the United States as an imperial power’ is read as unsound.49 Since 9/11 and due to the rising influence of neoconservative ideologues in the Bush cabinet, Ikenberry fears that the imperial logic threatens the post-war American-led hegemonic order that has supposedly worked ‘around open markets, security alliances, multilateral cooperation, and democratic community’.50 From World War II onwards, Ikenberry depicts the Cold War US national security state as having stopped short of any imperial endeavours. For him, talk of empire in the US national experience goes back to the Philippines and the like, to 1898. Hegemony is a better concept to account for ‘the construction of a rule-based international order’. In fact, neoliberal American hegemony was an open and democratic order premised on rules, institutions and partnerships which have had ‘an unprecedented array of partnerships spread across global and regional security, economic, and political realms.’51 Matthew Sparke characterizes an informal American imperialism as the geoeconomical and geopolitical logic of American hegemonic power in the global capitalist system reaffirmed after 1945.52 It is through these neoliberal geopolitics – of American hegemony – that American informal imperialism could last, if not be reinforced.53 For Sparke, if this understanding of hegemony – which he does not dispute but interprets as a form of informal imperialism – has been so powerful in American political science as well as in policymaking circles over the past sixty years, it is more a reflection of the pervasiveness of the ‘liberal tradition in America’ that goes hand in hand with the exceptionalist narrative and with the Cold War context of fighting Soviet communism and reading Marxist theorizing as product or advocacy of the USSR. It is a sign of the exceptionalist roots of this rhetoric of denial of imperialism that by choosing to focus on the depiction of the war in Iraq as an aggressive attempt at American empire-building it is defused from recognizing that this war ‘... has thematized and thereby also compromised the much more enduring and informal form of market-mediated American hegemony’.54 One could therefore argue, as many (Walter Russell Mead for instance55) now do, that the US is a ‘liberal empire’; that in some encompassing ways American (neo)liberal hegemony is a form of imperialism, albeit an informal one. The ‘(neo)liberal hegemony’ thesis may well be the best way to capture the US today, on the longue durée and in its present conjuncture. Others will rather opt for the liberal empire idea, for it allows more the exposition of the contradictions of the US state building and expansionist enterprise. All of this is to say that it becomes crucial to see US nationalism through its many different yet coexisting faces if one wishes to understand how US (neo)liberal ideology permeates US state governmentality.56 The Global War on Terror as Fantasies of an Empire of Security Following the collapse of communism, American strategists were at loose ends in grappling with the development of a coherent security policy. While few, even in those years of confusion, really doubted that America constituted the core of a global system that was characterized by its hegemony, the shock of 11 September concentrated minds. So something was added to the regnant assumption: neoconservative analysts could now trumpet a new-found political will intended to translate the vision of global dominance into reality. With the obvious evidence of American vulnerability, it became easy to legitimize a course of action that, absent the terrorist attacks on the country, would have smacked of old-fashioned imperialism. The clearest expression of this new will to power was found in the national strategy document unveiled in September 2002, and especially in the passages relating to preventive war. According to the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS), US military power must be ready to serve at any time if it is to have an impact. Both documents explicitly describe that the US will not only lead but dominate the strategically the world in trying to reach a ‘full spectrum dominance across the range of military operations’.57 The US makes no attempt at dissimulating its global strategy in its self-declared Global War on Terror (GWOT). Its military might is there to maintain unilateral global dominance and hegemony by having the infinite possibility of waging war. Over what interests and values would this GWOT be fought? The answer to this question directly concerns the influence of neocons in US national security conduct.58 At the turn of the millennium, influential neoconservative ideologues, figures like Paul Wolfowitz, Lewis Libby, Richard Perle, Stephen Hadley, Robert Kagan, and Irving and William Kristol, thought it was more than time for a more coherent, morally grounded, martial projection of US power falling under the auspices of a liberal benevolent empire using America’s ‘benign hegemony’ to spread democracy rather than just extend the range of the free market.59 In the first Bush administration, these neoconservative figures insisted that the US wanted to shape the world. They wanted ‘an America that was genuinely imperial ... not only because they believed it would make the world better, but because they wanted to see the United States make the world’.60 It comes as no surprise then that one of the main organizations associated with neoconservatives is literally called the Project for a New American Century. If we are to believe US decision makers and neoconservative analysts, the US should be ready to deploy a ‘democratic realism’ in its national security conduct, a powerful rhetoric that reinstates the American commitment to an empire of liberty and of democracy. The axiom of democratic realism stipulates that the United States ‘will support democracy everywhere, but we will commit blood and treasure only in places where there is a strategic necessity – meaning, places central to the larger war against the existential enemy, the enemy that poses a global mortal threat to freedom’.61 How this would strategically translate is still fuzzy though. In so many ways this ‘empire of liberty’ evoked the idea of an ‘empire of security’.62 There is but a thin line separating hegemony from empire, and the former can easily become imperilled by the latter, with its stress upon militarism, arrogance, and above all, the growing threat to employ force. In effect, as Americanist Kousar Azam aptly puts it, ‘The ethos of enlightenment that went into the foundational principles of the USA and promised mankind “an empire of liberty” is seldom reflected in US policies. The fractured discourses of American exceptionalism do not even promise that empire. On the contrary, the USA evokes the chimera of the return of empire that threatens to negate the notion of liberty and destroy in the process the very idea of sovereignty that makes liberty the basis of all civilized existence.’63

## 2NC – Terrorism – Ahmed

### The 1AC constructs terrorism through a paranoid fantasy of Islomophobia – those who do not fit into the perfect vision of American hegemony become irrational terrorists who must be exterminated – the cycle of genocide becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy where only interrogation of the violent epistemology can break out of the cycle – your ballot should be used as an ethical judgment against the racism that underpins the aff – heads up this card is long

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A range of studies indicate that these diverse phenomena affecting Muslim communities are in fact facets of a single overall social process, conveyed through the concept of Islamophobia.18 While sociological debate on the conceptual utility and coherence of Islamophobia continues, the increasing prevalence of prejudice and discrimination toward Muslim diasporas in the West over the last two decades is testament to the reality of the phenomena it is supposed to capture – whether or not the term is truly accurate as a sociological concept. The idea of Islamophobia conveys the sense of a distinctive form of racism and bigotry targeted specifically at members of Muslim communities, reinforced by negative stereotypes about Islam. In 1997, the Runnymede Trust offered its seminal definition of Islamophobia as a set of attitudes: Islam is perceived as a static, unchanging monolithic block; it is separate and “other”; it lacks values in common with other culture; is inferior to the West; and is irrational, primitive, sexist, violent, aggressive, and supportive of terrorism. Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices against Muslims and the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society, such that anti- Muslim hostility becomes normalised.19 In 2004, the Council of Europe defined Islamophobia as “the fear of or prejudiced viewpoint towards Islam, Muslims and matters pertaining to them. Whether it takes the shape of daily forms of racism and discrimination or more violent forms, Islamophobia is a violation of human rights and a threat to social cohesion.”20 However, as Maussen points out, there are important theoretical reservations for the use of the catch- all term Islamophobia to encompass so many diverse phenomena. Primarily, the term “groups 3 together all kinds of different forms of discourse, speech and acts, by suggesting that they all emanate from an identical ideological core, which is a „fear‟ or a „phobia‟ of Islam.” This amounts to a form of ideological reductionism which, however, fails to offer any further or deeper explanation of why this irrational fear of Islam has come about, and how it refracts through myriad different social structures into such a wide array of different exclusionary behaviours and processes. Thus, Maussen notes that while “these different kinds of discourse and speech” – such as negative media portrayals of Muslims, legislation impacting primarily or inordinately on Muslims, and sporadic acts of public violence against Muslims – may well be “related and feed into one another, but we cannot simply equate them all and treat them as comparable illustrations of a core ideology named „Islamophobia.‟” There is therefore a need to “distinguish speech and discourse on the one hand, from acts on the other hand.” While discourse and speech may be demeaning, it should not be conflated with “policies which limit the religious freedoms of Muslims, or with acts of violence, such as burning mosques or attacking Muslim girls who wear the headscarf.”21 This sort of critical evaluation of the application of the term Islamophobia raises important issues highlighting the underdevelopment of the concept as a sociological category capable of providing a credible theoretical explanatory framework by which to understand the diverse phenomena of anti- Muslim hostility and discrimination. Clearly, while there may be compelling reason to conclude that many of these phenomena are indeed motivated by a general irrational fear of Islam and Muslims – the causal origins of this irrational mindset are largely ignored in the literature that endorses the concept of Islamophobia. Furthermore, if such an ideological mindset is presumed to be the fundamental problem, how this mindset manages to encompass such a diversity of processes, institutions and behaviours not only in a single society, but indeed across multiple societies simultaneously, remains unexplained. In effect, Islamophobia becomes a self-reinforcing circular concept, in which anti-Muslim hostility is generated by nothing more than an irrational hostility toward Muslims – effectively, Islamophobia creates Islamophobia. Although the conceptual definitions and theoretical efficacy of Islamophobia is therefore still hotly contested in academic literature, it is indisputable that there has been a meteoric rise in anti-Muslim hostility and discrimination on a global scale. According to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, which has monitored this phenomenon since 2001, Islamophobia in the form of discrimination and violence specifically toward members of Muslim diaspora communities in the EU has increased dramatically. In particular, anti-Muslim prejudice in EU countries is manifest not simply in regressive ideological perspectives leading to acts of violence, but also in tangible exclusionary patterns in housing, education, and employment.22 A report co-sponsored by the University of California, Berkeley, Center for Race and Gender, similarly found evidence that Islamophobia in the US is an increasingly powerful force in the political landscape, negatively affecting Muslims in terms of employment, education, and housing, as well as hate crimes and profiling by security agencies.23 The overall picture is of an increasing sense of unease, fear and hostility between Muslims and non- Muslims over the last decade. Overwhelmingly, this has coincided with a mainstream media narrative in which Islam and Muslims are increasingly projected as “a threat to traditional British customs, values and ways of life”, because “there is no common ground between the West and Islam.”24 Another study by Cardiff University‟s School of Journalism, analyzing UK press coverage of British Muslims from 2000 to 2008, found that “the bulk of coverage of British Muslims – around two thirds – focuses on Muslims as a threat (in relation to terrorism), a problem (in terms of differences in values) or both (Muslim extremism in general).” Further, it concluded that: “Four of the five most common discourses used about Muslims in the British press associate Islam/Muslims with threats, 4 problems or in opposition to dominant British values.”25 A similar study of Islamophobia in the American media concluded that “media stereotyping” after 9/11 “primed Americans to understand the 9/11 attacks as representative of Arab political culture and Islamic devotion,” and was “an important factor in the backlash that afflicted these communities post-9/11.” The study further documents an “alarming deterioration in Islamophobic hate speech in the media” up to 2006.26 A 2008 World Economic Forum study of the way „Muslim-West‟ relations are covered across global media in a total of 24 Muslim-majority and non-Muslim-majority countries found that “negative coverage was 10 times more frequent than positive coverage” with Muslims being “associated with fundamentalist and extremist activities more than six times as often as other religious protagonists.”27 The corporate media‟s increasing demonization of Islam and Muslims is not occurring in a silo, but is being driven very much by the agendas of government and security agencies. On the one hand, the corporate media relies relatively uncritically on government and security agencies for its information on foreign policy and intelligence matters, including terrorism.28 On the other, there have been direct efforts from security agencies to influence the media. Since 1990, for instance, the Pentagon has bribed, pressured, and censored Hollywood film-makers to adapt story lines to support its propaganda.29 Reviewing over a thousand Hollywood movies, Jack Shaheen, Professor Emeritus of Mass Communication at Southern-Illinois University, found that: “Today‟s image makers regularly link the Islamic faith with male supremacy, holy war, and acts of terror, depicting Arab Muslims as hostile alien intruders, and as lecherous, oily sheikhs, intent on using nuclear weapons. When mosques are displayed onscreen, the camera inevitably cuts to Arabs praying, and then gunning down civilians.”30 Here, the mainstream media plays a critical function in ideologically linking the international to the domestic, in particular, the trajectory of Western foreign policy in Muslim-majority theatres across the Middle East and Central Asia, as well as the processes of Islamophobia and radicalisation experienced within Muslim diaspora communities in the West. On the one hand, Islamophobic media narratives buttress anti-Muslim public opinion at home, alienating Muslims and fuelling the extremist rhetoric of far right groups. Simultaneously, images of devastation and destruction from Muslim-majority theatres of war such as Iraq and Afghanistan also distress and anger Muslim diaspora communities, further exacerbating alienation. In effect, the media acts as a symbiotic link between Islamophobia at home and abroad, as it mediates extremist rhetoric from neoconservative and right-wing factions and the official language of government and security agencies who attempt to pander to Islamophobic public opinion on political issues such as immigration and terrorism. Thus, there is perhaps no clearer instantiation of the security-dynamics of Islamophobia than the actual activities of Western security agencies. After the US Department of Justice passed a regulation allowing indefinite detention on 20th September 2001, nearly 1,200 Arabs and Muslims were secretly arrested and detained without charge.31 The US National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) “call-in” program required male visitors from twenty-four Arab and Muslim countries and North Korea to register with INS offices. No terrorists were found, yet over 13,000 of the 80,000 men who registered were threatened with deportation, and many were “detained in harsh conditions.”32 In the UK, more than a thousand Muslims have been detained without charge under anti-terror laws, out of which only a handful have been convicted of terrorist offences. Worldwide, more than 100,000 Muslim men – victims of the CIA‟s extraordinary rendition programme – are being detained without charges “in secretive American-run jails and interrogation centres similar to the notorious Abu Ghraib Prison” under conditions which violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions on the Treatment of Prisoners, and UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.33 5 Such practices accompany Anglo-American military engagements in predominantly Muslim theatres of war, regions often described as dangerous failed zones harbouring potential Islamist terrorists planning to inflict apocalyptic forms of mass destruction on Western civilization.34 Such military engagements also tend to result in the indiscriminate killings of predominantly Muslim civilians, and correlate invariably with their strategic location vis-à-vis contested energy reserves in the Middle East, Central Asia and Northwest Africa. Iraq provides a case-in-point. From 1991 to 2007, the total civilian death toll in Iraq as a direct and indirect consequence of Anglo-American invasions, socio-economic deprivation, infrastructure destruction, and occupation amounts to approximately 3 million over a period of sixteen years.35 The scale of this violence is thus larger than some of the most well-known cases of twentieth century genocide such as in Cambodia, K

ampuchea, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda. As Walt points out, estimating the number of Muslims killed directly and indirectly by U.S. forces over the last 30 years suggests at least 100 Muslim fatalities for every US one. He thus observes: “When you kill tens of thousands of people in other countries – and sometimes for no good reason – you shouldn‟t be surprised when people in those countries are enraged by this behavior and interested in revenge.”36 This argument amply refutes the assumption that foreign policy has no relationship to terrorism and violent radicalisation. In particular, taking a broader historical view of the continuity of US-UK interventionism in the Gulf region going back to 1991 demonstrates not only the immense scale of the violence inflicted upon Iraqi civilians, but also illustrates that British interventionism in the region preceded the emergence and proliferation of Islamist-inspired terrorist attacks against Western targets. Thus, Ralph argues that the massive military violence that has been inflicted predominantly on the civilian populations of Muslim-majority regions is only possible by their having been “Islamophobically” constructed as having lives that are of less value compared to those of Western citizens.37 But while the irrational fear of Islam and Muslims is clearly a significant factor in all these disparate phenomena, Islamophobia as a sociological concept offers little by way of a coherent causal explanation of how or why these phenomena are escalating simultaneously. Islamophobia as Securitization It is therefore imperative to recognize that Islamophobia is distinctive precisely as a unique form of securitization targeted specifically at Muslim communities in the context of the particular objectives, interests and anxieties of powerful political actors. Indeed, Islamophobia cannot be understood as a sociological category without situating it in the context of the evolving socio-political relations of global imperialism, which in turn explain the political dynamic of the securitization of Muslim communities. Wæver‟s seminal concept of securitisation referred to a „speech act‟ – an act of labelling – whereby political authorities identify an existential threat to the state which, because of its extreme nature, justifies moving beyond conventional security measures within the public rule of law, thus permitting the execution of extra-legal emergence powers that are henceforth “above politics.”38 Thus, Buzan et. al argued that “the priority and the urgency of an existential threat” permits the state resort to consistent “violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed.” Securitisation thus legitimises the state of exception and the suspension of democracy.39 6 In the early 1990s, Willy Claes, then NATO Secretary-General identified “Islamic fundamentalism” as a new threat to Western Europe replacing the defunct USSR.40 By the late 1990s, a number of hearings had been held in the Congress and Senate on the Islamist threat from the Middle East and Central Asia.41 The publication of Samuel Huntington‟s influential thesis on the clash of civilizations was a decisive turning-point in the solidification of this strategic thinking.42 After 9/11, security agencies increasingly generalized the threat of Islamist terrorism as being, despite its marginality, nevertheless widely dispersed throughout Muslim communities, necessitating comprehensive regimes of surveillance, policing and in some regions counterinsurgency. A sensitive briefing paper published by the Pentagon agency, Counterintelligence Field Activity (which operated from 2002 to 2008, after which its activities were subsumed by the Defense Intelligence Agency), argued that “political Islam wages an ideological battle against the non-Islamic world at the tactical, operational and strategic level. The West‟s response is focused at the tactical and operation level, leaving the strategic level – Islam – unaddressed.” The paper concludes that “Islam is an ideological engine of war (Jihad),” and “no one is looking for its off switch” due to political “indecision [over] whether Islam is radical or being radicalized.” Attempting to review the Qur‟an and Prophetic traditions, the paper infers that “Strategic themes suggest Islam is radical by nature... Muhammad‟s behaviors today would be defined as radical.” Western policymakers can no longer afford to overlook the “cult characteristics of Islam.” Indeed even Islam‟s advocacy of charity – the principle known as Zakat considered an obligatory „pillar‟ of Islam – is described as “an asymmetrical war-fighting funding mechanism.” The only reason that the US has failed to suffer scattered insurgent terrorist attacks – as opposed to the single, concentrated and catastrophic attack of 9/11 – is primarily due to its relatively small Muslim population. Accordingly, the threat of such insurgency will increase as the Muslim minority grows and gains more influence. The Pentagon cites successful and attempted terrorist attacks in Britain, along with the predominantly Muslim riots in France, as examples.43 Thus, Tim Savage, division chief at the State Department‟s Office of European Analysis argues that Europe‟s Muslim population is expected to double while its non-Muslim population is projected to fall by at least 3.5 per cent. At worse, he speculates that by mid-century Muslims might outnumber non-Muslims not only in France, but throughout Western Europe. European intelligence analysts already estimate that up to 2 per cent of the continent‟s Muslims – half a million people – are involved in extremist activity. This number, for which no corroborating evidence exists, is so huge according to Savage not because of the role of Islamic fundamentalism per se, but rather simply due to the inevitable “chemistry resulting from Muslims‟ encounter with Europe [which] seems to make certain individuals more susceptible to recruitment into terrorist activities.” Therefore, he implies, terrorists are supposedly born simply from the identity crisis generated by Muslim immigration to Europe – “A larger group of terrorists by far is recruited from the masses of young men, many of them middle- class, who experience a sort of culture shock in Europe and become radicalized „born again‟ Islamists.”44 Security agencies are preoccupied with population politics not only in the context of the alleged dangers posed by the rising number of Muslims in the US, Britain and Western Europe, but also in terms of rising populations in the South in general, and intensifying population movements toward the West as people attempt to escape the calamities created by climate change, food insecurity and resource scarcity. In this sense, security agencies project a direct connection between the question of civil unrest, global crises and rising populations of „Others‟, particularly Muslims. According to then-CIA Director Michael V. Hayden, rising world population and immigration “could undermine the stability of some of the world‟s most fragile states, especially in Africa, while in the 7 West, governments will be forced to grapple with ever larger immigrant communities and deepening divisions over ethnicity and race.” Noting the projected 33 percent growth in global population over the next 40 years, he warned that regional friendly oil-exporting regimes “like Niger and Libya will be forced to rapidly find food, shelter and jobs for millions, or deal with restive populations that „could be easily attracted to violence, civil unrest, or extremism.‟” Corroborating the fears described above, he added that rising world population would also have a debilitating impact within the West due to growing ethnicity differentials between shrinking and expanding population groups: “European countries, many of which already have large immigrant communities, will see particular growth in their Muslim populations while the number of non-Muslims will shrink as birthrates fall. „Social integration of immigrants will pose a significant challenge to many host nations – again boosting the potential for unrest and extremism,‟ Hayden said.”45 Furthermore, Muslim communities – both in the form of diasporas in the West and Muslim-majority countries in strategic regions of the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa – are perceived to cut across the faultlines of increasingly complex non-traditional security challenges such as climate change, energy depletion, water shortages and food insecurity. A recent US Army War College study makes reference to Huntington‟s clash thesis, arguing that while it “captured the possibilities” already emerging in the 1990s: “... the future and its implications are even darker than what Professor Huntington suggested.... The confluence between the world‟s greatest reserves of petroleum and the extraordinary difficulties that the Islamic world is having, and will continue to have, in confronting a civilization that has taken the West 900 years to develop will create challenges that strategists are only now beginning to grasp.”46 In other words, there is a direct link between Western energy interests, the „War on Terror‟, and the West‟s military pre-occupation with the Muslim world. For example, the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of „the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents‟, the report concludes that „The implications for future conflict are ominous.‟47 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: „In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s‟, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. „Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.‟48 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable „youth bulge‟ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent, and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to „endemic unemployment‟ will be channelled through „political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces.‟49 8 The Exclusionary Logic of Securitization Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrates how securitisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarisation against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order – that is, who are anathema to imperial interests. Due to the geopolitical significance of Muslim-majority regions to imperial interests and their links to Muslim diasporas in the West, this securitization process overwhelmingly focuses on the externalisation of Muslims. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of Islamophobia is insufficient to understand its causal dynamics. For the mere identification of a security issue does not necessarily corresponding to an objective threat, but represents the interests of power. This also means that the state of exception cannot simply be unilaterally decreed by the sovereign, but that the act of speech must conform to a normative grammar of security by a position of authority speaking to an audience that understands and is convinced by this act. Thus, the specific socio-political relations that lead to securitisation are under- theorised. As McDonald points out: “The potential for security to be constructed over time through a range of incremental processes and representations is not addressed, and the question of why particular representations resonate with relevant constituencies is under‐theorized.”50 He notes that questions like “Why are some political communities more likely to view certain actors and dynamics as threatening? What role do narratives of history, culture and identity have in underpinning or legitimating particular forms of securitization?” are obscured.51 Yet answers to such questions must go beyond a form of discourse-reductionism focusing exclusively on „narratives of history, cultural and identity‟, to explore the political economy with which these narratives are co-extensive. As Doug Stokes points out: “While the WoT [„War on Terror‟] is undoubtedly a discursive complex whereby modes of representation about terrorism, non-Western populations and the construction of stark boundaries (you are either with us or with the terrorists) operate to exclude and include, it is also intimately bound up with political and economic processes... Specifically, the wars launched in the name of counter-terrorism are not purely driven by certain hegemonic discourses, but are also part of the West‟s economic interests in oil, strategic interests in military bases in the Middle East and the desire to maintain American hegemony into the twenty-first century by controlling one of the crucial resource-rich regions for global capitalism.”52 In other words, the hegemonic construction of exclusionary discourses is always inherently politically-constituted, and therefore by the same token, politically-embedded and politically- transformative. Rather than securitisation only justifying the suspension of law to pave the way for exceptional measures outside the political, contemporary security constructions of „Islam‟ and „Muslims‟ show that it can also lead to a form of governmentality that permanently transforms the way in which populations are politically managed and reproduced.53 The Paris school of Security Studies thus points out that securitisation is equally about risk management, actively conducted by security professionals working across multiple social bureaucracies in the army, intelligence services, police forces, border controls, defence companies, insurance firms, and so on. Their activities construct “regimes of truth” which draw on “numerical data and statistics, technologies of biometrics and sociological profiles of potential dangerous behaviour” to “determine what exactly constitutes 9 security”, and whose expertise empowers them to advise state-leaders.54 Securitisation therefore “works through everyday technologies, through the effects of power that are continuous rather than exceptional, through political struggles, and especially through institutional competition within the professional security field in which the most trivial interests are at stake.”55 The Paris school thus highlights that the state-level „speech act‟ privileged by the Copenhagen school cannot simply appear ex-nihilo as a discursive rupture that innovates a completely new „regime of truth‟, but must emerge from prior „normal‟ political processes therefore amplifying pre-existing exclusionary „regimes of truth‟ in new directions. Yet while identifying the role of “interests”, “institutional competition” and the status of the “professional security field”, the Paris schools offers no exploration of the concrete political and economic structures by which these are constituted, and how they thus interact with and relate to the operation of state power. By what socio-political relations is the expertise of security professionals privileged and sanctioned by the state? What historically- specific social conditions prompt the construction of exclusionary „regimes of truth‟ through processes of everyday political institutional struggles, as well as through extraordinary acts of state- level decisionism enforcing exceptional measures? Furthermore, the sharp theoretical distinction between the Copenhagen and Paris schools collapses in the face of historical and empirical reality. Anti-Western terrorist attacks such as 9/11 prompt state- level emergency responses which, justified by the perception of unprecedented threat, lead to adoption of extraordinary military and police responses. Yet these responses do not merely suspend constitutional law in the face of emergency – they establish permanence precisely through exploiting the declared state of emergency to legitimise the institutionalisation of exceptional measures within the body politic, thus purporting to permanently transform the constitutional order. Securitisation, in other words, can lead to wholesale militarisation of society. Of course, this is not to suggest that the suspension of elements of the constitutional order leading to its permanent transformation amounts to a wholesale annulment of democracy. Rather, this process of militarisation encompasses the progressive institutionalisation of exceptional extra-constitutional measures – this undermines the democratic system on security grounds, and continually threatens to subvert it further. Yet what remains unanswered here is the very nature of the political processes that drive securitisation, their institutional origin, and the socio-political relations by which they are constituted. Ultimately, the most significant underlying causal factor is a deepening perception of fundamental social crisis. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of whom destroys the other on the basis of a pre-eminence in bureaucratic military-political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different.56 In Hinton‟s words: “Genocides are distinguished by a process of „othering‟ in which the boundaries of an imagined community are reshaped in such a manner that a previously „included‟ group (albeit often included only tangentially) is ideologically recast (almost always in dehumanizing rhetoric) as being outside the community, as a threatening and dangerous „other‟ – whether racial, political, ethnic, religious, economic, and so on – that must be annihilated.”57 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and „Otherised‟ in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups 10 as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of „inclusion‟, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.58 This recalls Lemkin‟s recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally conjoined to a wider socio- political project – or colonial project – designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives, can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable.59 Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated socio-political crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new „outsider‟ group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.60 This does not imply that the current logic of securitisation is necessarily genocidal. Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group identity formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation processes behind contemporary mass violence. This highlights the fundamental connection between social crisis, the break-down of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities, and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed „outsider‟ group vindicating various forms of violence. Conclusions Widespread government and public anxieties about the overlapping dangers of global recession, environmental degradation, resource depletion, food price inflation, violent conflict, terrorism, and so on, can often translate into a mistrust of prevailing institutions and norms. Depending on one‟s political orientation, this can lead to the projection of those anxieties onto specific institutions, norms, or even social groups. It is in this context that historians of mass violence point out that the processes that lead to genocide invariably commence with the eruption of social crisis generating radical uncertainty, which is subliminally resolved by projection of blame onto social groups who begin to be constructed as outsiders. Their extermination, partial or otherwise, is thus increasingly viewed as a „final solution‟ by which the perpetrator group exculpates itself and psychologically alleviates its anxieties about entrenched crises.61 In the contemporary global context, the securitization of Islam and Muslims driving the entrenchment of Islamophobia is itself being driven by a deepening perception of social crises at multiple levels of society, vindicating the sense of a fundamental failure of prevailing institutions and values. At the level of defence planning, the pre-9/11 official recognition of an ongoing and inevitable decline in U.S. hegemony has been compounded by the emergence and prevalence of non-traditional security challenges whose dynamic has been accelerated precisely by the normal functioning of the US.- dominate global political economy. The strategic imperative throughout the „War on Terror‟ to shore11 up an increasingly beleaguered U.S. hegemony through domination of the world‟s critical energy resources and transhipment routes has in turn focused the imaginations of security agencies on the problematic role of Muslim-majority regions. Simultaneously, the institutionalization of this paranoia about the security threat potentially posed by Islam and Muslims in the form of wide-ranging new domestic police-powers – combined with the corporate media‟s normalization of mass military violence in Muslim-majority regions as „par for the course‟ required to defend Western civilization against terrorism – has generated a parallel paranoia throughout Western societies. This irrational paranoia grows increasingly targeted and dangerous as global ecological, energy and economic crises – largely systemic in origin – continue to undermine the social fabric, to the impotence of the conventional paraphernalia of the Western political bureaucracy. This further fuels both government and public anxieties, and intensifies the securitization processes that drive the social polarisation of insider and outsider groups, of which Muslims are the focal point. In this context, does the conduct of actual Anglo-American military engagements in Muslim-majority regions, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Algeria, and so on, indicate an Islamophobic „Muslim- centric‟ dynamic to such practices, evincing a tendentially genocidal logic, or is the systematic targeting of largely Muslim groups simply an accident of geopolitical interest? This discussion suggests that the answer is both. Processes of „Otherization‟ due to securitization tend to become increasingly radicalized on the ground precisely in the context of increasingly violent socio-political contestations and social crisis. It is not a far cry to suggest that US wars in Muslim-majority theatres of war are therefore undergoing a process of radicalization, fuelled by both the difficulty and entrenchment of conflict in for instance Afghanistan and Pakistan, the terrorism that conflict inevitably generates, as well as the systemic non-traditional security challenges such as food, water and economic problems increasingly afflicting Muslim-majority regions. This, of course, brings us to the thorny question, given our reference to the genocide literature, of how to conceptualize the intentional dynamic of much of this violence, particularly given that it often involves massive and indiscriminate killings of predominantly Muslim civilians. These killings are not only “degenerate” in Shaw‟s sense of the foreseeable, tacitly-condoned collateral damage of technologized ways of war designed to minimize Western military casualties.62 They often include confirmed episodes of deliberate targeting of civilians as an integral strategy of war. Congressional testimony of US Army combat veterans in Iraq, for example, refers to “free fire orders... described by the Soldiers who had been deployed during the invasion as coming from their commanders who told them „kill everything that moves‟ which included all civilians.”63 Even episodes of violence largely attributed to US incompetence may be more problematic, requiring more detailed empirical determination. Iraq expert Toby Dodge for instance emphasises that a substantive portion of civilian deaths in Iraq are due to the escalation of violent sectarian conflict under the “complete collapse” of the administrative and coercive capacities of the Iraqi state, for which he primarily blames “the United States‟ inability to reconstruct them.”64 Yet his analysis overlooks compelling evidence that at least to some degree, US forces intentionally brought about this collapse and exacerbated sectarian divisions as a strategy to weaken Iraq‟s capacity for self- determination, thereby consolidating its dependence on US security forces and legitimizing a permanent de facto occupation. Several credible journalistic and intelligence investigations argue that elements of the Bush administration envisaged a forcible division of Iraq along ethno-religious lines from the outset of its war-planning, and that for some years the US actively financed an eclectic panoply of Shi‟ite death squads and Sunni insurgents, both prime culprits in sectarian violence.65 Cook, in this vein, suggests that at least in part the sectarian chaos in Iraq and the Middle East is the intended outcome of an imperial strategy of „divide-and-rule.‟66 12 On the other hand, clear differences in US and British approaches further complexify the picture and underscore again the need for a nuanced approach. While US forces in Afghanistan frequently call on air support, which has resulted in indiscriminate bombings of Afghan civilians; British forces have adopted precisely the opposite strategy, preferring to work on the ground and explicitly minimizing reliance on air support precisely to try to minimize Afghan civilian casualties with a view to increase popular support. In other words, even while at some level it seems plausible that Islamophobic processes of „Otherization‟ due to securitization are at work, the dynamic of violence cannot be simplistically reduced to this, and each conflict on the ground generates its own specific trajectories that require careful explanation. It would therefore be premature and unwarranted to causally reduce these disparate phenomena – the military violence of the „War on Terror‟ in foreign theatres in Muslim-majority regions, its domestic corollary in counter-terror police-powers focusing largely on Muslim diasporas, and the escalation of exclusionary paranoia and hostility toward Islam and Muslims from Western mainstream institutions – to an amorphous conception of „Islamophobia‟. While these processes should not simply be theorized as a single continuum of imperial Islamophobic violence tending potentially toward genocidal conduct, it is equally mistaken to ignore the fact that these phenomena are intimately interrelated. This interrelation can only be understood in the context of the imperial socio-political relations of securitization – the deepening perception of social and global crisis, and the projection of anxieties toward these crises onto the geopolitical faultlines of an increasingly fragile U.S.-dominated global political economy, which happen to cross Muslim-majority regions of the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa. While contemporary Islamophobia, then, encompasses these different domestic and global processes, it is itself in some ways merely an ideological symptom of a global Western civilization that is in many ways coming apart at the seams. Yet increasingly, the symptom is itself feeding back on and radicalizing the dynamic of the systemic processes by which it is generated. The overwhelming danger is that if present trends in the international system are permitted to continue – the normalization of imperial military violence abroad, the legitimization of draconian policing at home, and the unravelling of social relations due to the intensification of socio-political and economic crisis – these trends may well begin to culminate in increasingly genocidal outcomes.

## 2NC – Militarism

### It creates a state of exception resulting in militarized solutiosn

Trennel, 06 [Paul – Ph.D University of Wales, “The (Im)possibility of Environmental Security”] PDF, KENTUCKY

A further association of conventional security practices that could be misguidedly imported into the environmental realm is the use of military force to attain security. Security has for centuries been the preserve of the military, and the provision of security remains highly entangled with military institutions. As such concern has been expressed that casting the environment in security terms may lead to greater military involvement in addressing environmental problems. For their part the military have been keen to involve themselves in environmental matters due to the fact that, in the aftermath of the Cold War, this represents a good way to ensure continued status and funding (Conca, 1994: 16). Yet further military involvement in the environmental sector would be unwelcome and counterproductive in numerous ways, not least because “there are of course, no military solutions to environmental insecurity” (WCED, 1987: 301). One cannot bomb the environment back into good health, and the secretive and hierarchical structures that dominate military organisations are fundamentally unsuited to environmental challenges which demand cooperative and innovative solutions (Deudney, 1991: 24). More than just hinder the search for solutions, military organisations actively exacerbate environmental problems. Jon Barnett has claimed that “militarization is arguably the single biggest risk to human beings” (2001: 19). There is the obvious point that military conflict rarely passes without high numbers of fatalities. However, the preparations and conduct of military conflict also have hugely detrimental environmental impacts. For example it is estimated that the burning of oil fields during the 1991 Gulf War produced one hundred times the carbon dioxide emissions emitted by an entire year of global economic trading (Brock, 1991: 411). Similarly devastating environmental damage is sustained via nuclear testing and military preparations. Legitimising a military role in addressing environmental problems by framing environmental concerns in terms of security may serve only to enshrine the military’s status as “protected polluters” (Dalby, 1992b: 512) and thereby create further environmental damage. Moreover, should the military succeed in hijacking a role in addressing environmental issues, the funding that it would receive for this function would represent serious “opportunity costs” to environmental initiatives by siphoning off funds that could be spent on more environmentally oriented solutions (Stern, 1995: 222)[[1]](#footnote-1). In sum, in the quest to address environmental vulnerability it would seem counterproductive to follow any strategy that may give further justification to the existence and dominance of an industry that does so much to harm the environment.

## 2NC – Turns Cooperation

### AND – It prevents cooperation necessary to solve

Trennel, 06 [Paul – Ph.D University of Wales, “The (Im)possibility of Environmental Security”] PDF, KENTUCKY

Secondly, the zero-sum mindset of conventional security may hinder the development of effective solutions by preventing transnational cooperation. Ken Conca has suggested “the concept of security invokes images of insulation” (1994: 18) whereby one takes care of one‟s own land and people by any means necessary, and generally disregards the impact of this on other countries. This may lead to a response whereby states attempt to forestall environmental damage by „target hardening‟; protecting their own territory rather than confronting the root of the problem. For example, it is not inconceivable that developed nations could protect against the threat of rising sea levels by utilising their technological and engineering expertise to construct offshore dams to divert water away from major cities (Myers, 1993: 196). This is an expensive but real possibility, and such action would fulfil the obligation of the state to provide security for its citizens. The problem lies with the fact that “as far as we try to find national solutions for environmental problems we do not really solve them but manage them instead” (Kakonen, 1994: 3). Environmental problems are international in terms of both scope and impact, and therefore only truly international solutions are likely to prove true solutions.

## 2NC – A2 – Vague Alts Bad

### Alternative isn’t vague – it is a clear reject of the aff’s securitization and offering a deconstruction of that discourse through citizen action – LAL highlights the grass roots movement and questioning of speech acts that our alternative represents

### AND – Vague alts good

### Forces a defense of the aff on the link level which is the crux of our argument

### Fair – their perms are vague and change throughout the round

### Topicality – the plan is more vague – doesn’t define what is “substantial” or how the plan will be implemented – causes aff conditionality – outweighs because they started the abuse – vote neg to force better plan writing and advocacy skills

### AT WORST – Reject the argument not the team

#### Craig (bioD) — law prof – invisible threshold is security rhetoric

#### Deibel (warming) – war college – incentive to be bought off

#### EPA (wetland) – Envir Protec Agency

#### Brown (terrorism) – emergency preparedness + response in homeland security

# 1NR

### 2NC – Ext: Drilling Now

#### Extend 1NC 2 – drilling now --- deepwater drilling is accelerating in the Gulf – that’s the Vancouver Sun 13 evidence. Thirty-six projects exist now and that will almost double in the near future.

#### This makes their impact inevitable --- the plan doesn’t prevent U.S. drilling in the Gulf and the small text of their Shields 12 evidence concedes U.S. drilling is the problem.

#### U.S. drilling makes Gulf destruction inevitable

Mufson, 4/19/2012 (Steven, Two years after BP oil spill, offshore drilling still poses risks, Washington Post, p.

<http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-04-19/business/35453515_1_oil-spill-peter-roopnarine-transocean>) [MN]

Two years after a blowout on BP’s Macondo well killed 11 men and triggered the largest oil spill in U.S. history, oil companies are again plying the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Forty-one deep-water rigs are in the gulf. The vast majority of them are drilling new holes or working over old ones, while the other behemoths are idle as they await work or repairs. A brand new rig — the South Korean-built Pacific Santa Ana, capable of drilling to a depth of 7.5 miles — is on its way to a Chevron well. But three recent incidents in other parts of the world show just how risky and sensitive offshore drilling remains. In the North Sea, French oil giant Total is still battling to regain control of a natural gas well that has been leaking for nearly four weeks. Meanwhile, Brazil has confiscated the passports of 11 Chevron employees and five employees of drilling contractor Transocean as they await trial on criminal charges related to an offshore oil spill there. And in December, about 40,000 barrels of crude oil leaked out of a five-year-old loading line between a floating storage vessel and an oil tanker in a Royal Dutch Shell field off the coast of Nigeria. Many experts say that even with tougher regulations here in the United States, such incidents are inevitable. “I’m not saying we shouldn’t do it [offshore drilling], but we ought to go at it with our eyes open,” said Roger Rufe, a retired Coast Guard vice admiral. “We can’t do it with a human-designed system and not expect that there will be occasional problems with it.” Shell is one company particularly anxious to avoid the slightest whiff of trouble. It is on the verge of getting the final two permits needed to drill this summer in the Chukchi Sea, off Alaska’s Arctic Coast, a plan that has aroused opposition from a broad array of environmental groups. So on April 10 when federal regulators told Shell that they had spotted a 1-by-10-mile oil sheen in the eight miles of water between two Shell production platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, executives acted quickly. They promptly mobilized an oil cleanup vessel and sent two remotely operated underwater vehicles to scour the sea floor. It turned out that the oil — only six barrels — came from a natural seep common in the gulf. “Post-Macondo, there’s no such thing as a small spill,” said an executive from another big oil company, who asked for anonymity because he was not authorized to comment. With the anniversary of the BP spill, many experts are reassessing U.S. progress since the accident. And environmentalists are assessing damages. A National Wildlife Federation report said, for example, that the shrimp catch increased last year but that since the spill 523 dolphins have been stranded onshore, four times the historic average; 95 percent of them were dead. A team of scientists led by Peter Roopnarine of the California Academy of Sciences said oysters collected post-spill contain higher concentrations of heavy metals in their shells, gills and muscle tissue than those collected before the spill. The members of the presidential Oil Spill Commission that investigated the BP spill said in a report that they were “encouraged” by reforms at the Interior Department, which oversees drilling in U.S. waters. But they said they are dismayed by the failure of Congress to enact some reforms into law, worried about the prospect of Arctic drilling, and concerned that the United States had not altered the embargo of Cuba to allow U.S. vessels to respond if there was a spill from a rig drilling in Cuban waters. Environmental groups are more adamant. Oceana, a group opposed to offshore drilling, said “offshore drilling safety has not improved.”

#### Safe technology doesn’t check spills

DOW ‘12 (DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, "OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF DRILLING", <https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=vandq=cache:0hRYuUTRu6wJ:www.defenders.org/publications/impacts_of_outer_continental_shelf_drilling.pdf+andhl=enandgl=usandpid=blandsrcid=ADGEESimvF33YzLvIENzYCceMo6rbZBgGL_qq52L3lPQbQp9oCH-vySHbDLITJDlQ61o__xCzITqYc56OWssn5OEjL5C7HATlZWYsBP4Ec9SoxALLnh9Rk0NY_ANjAdUgfb3vh0C-e31andsig=AHIEtbSgOUGu_Q4pEWJM2fsBDGMuNjtfvA>)

Spills, Leaks and Catastrophes. Even with safety protocols in place, leaks and spills are inevitable— each year U.S. drilling operations send an average of 880,000 gallons of oil into the ocean. Then there are the unanticipated catastrophes. In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed 113 of the oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico and damaged 457 pipelines. Hurricane damage caused at least 124 different spills, totaling over 17,700 barrels (743,000 gallons) of petroleum products. Oil is toxic to the plants and microscopic animals that form the basis of the marine food chain. It also poisons birds, mammals and fish. Those not killed outright can suffer a slow death from debilitating illness and injury.

#### More drilling is on the way --- predictive evidence

Morgan, 7/4/2013 (John, Return of Deepwater Rigs Bodes Well for Growth in Gulf of Mexico, Money News, p. <http://www.moneynews.com/Economy/Deepwater-Rigs-Gulf-Mexico/2013/07/04/id/513405>) [MN]

Deepwater drilling has made a strong comeback in the Gulf of Mexico only three years after the BP disaster, and it may be the start of a new energy growth cycle there, according to MSN Money. Instead of becoming a drilling wasteland following the BP disaster that created the worst oil spill in U.S. history, Gulf exploration and production apparently is now one of the reasons the nation is moving toward energy independence. The Houston Business Journal reported recently 40 rigs are under contract in the Gulf – only five less than were predicted for 2013 before the BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster – and the count could double by 2017. Editor's Note: “After essentially being left for dead following the devastating (BP) blowout, we believe the deepwater Gulf of Mexico is in the early stages of an extended growth cycle,” a report from the International Strategy & Investment Group LLC said. Those analysts predicted the Gulf of Mexico may be the strongest offshore market in the world through 2015.

### 2NC – Ext: THA No Solve

#### Vagueness means that THA legislation is not sufficient to solve safety issues

McLaughlin, Harte Research Institute for Gulf of Mexico Studies Endowed Chair, et. al 12

[Richard, November/December 2012, The Houston Lawyer, “Gulf of Mexico Offshore Transboundary Hydrocarbon Development: Legal Issues Between Mexico & the U.S.,” <http://www.law.uh.edu/mexican-law/documents/HoustonLawyerarticleNovDec2012.pdf>, p. 24-25, Accessed 6/30/13, CB]

¶ The Agreement also allows for inspections by both parties in their respective¶ offshore facilities. The details of when¶ these inspections can take place, as well¶ as under what procedures and circumstances, are not specified in the Agreement and further regulation in this¶ matter will be necessary for adequate¶ implementation.32 The Agreement does,¶ however, set up a procedure in which¶ inspectors from one country can request¶ that the other party cease activities in¶ case of emergencies where there is a risk¶ of loss to life, serious bodily injury or¶ damage to the environment.33¶ Safety and Environmental Protection¶ Article 10 of the Agreement contains¶ rather broad language concerning safety¶ and environmental protection. It is somewhat insufficient, as it does not establish any specific environmental or safety¶ regulations and instead provides general¶ language about adopting common standards and requirements whose adequacy¶ and compatibility is yet to be seen.3"1 As¶ is recurrent in this Agreement, it leaves¶ the development of specific procedures¶ for the implementation of this Article to¶ a later time. ¶ Termination¶ The Agreement states that it can be terminated either by mutual agreement or¶ by either country at any time via written¶ notice within a specified time period.36¶ Interestingly, in the event of termination¶ the two countries must begin consultations to develop a new agreement ad-¶ dressing transboundary reservoirs.37¶ Conclusion¶ As is readily apparent from this brief¶ article, offshore transboundary hydrocarbon exploitation triggers a broad¶ range of legal and policy challenges. The¶ Agreement, while a positive first step, is¶ as notable for what it lacks as for what it¶ contains. Clearly, both nations intended¶ to leave some areas of ambiguity that¶ could be later developed through negotiations or state practice. Nonetheless,¶ legitimate questions exist as to whether¶ Mexico's current constitutional and legal¶ framework will allow this Agreement to¶ be carried out in a successful manner.38¶ Similarly, the U.S. has never been a party¶ to an international agreement to jointly¶ develop hydrocarbon resources that extend across international boundaries.39¶ Consequently, It will have to develop a completely new regulatory structure capable of governing the unique set of issues common to international unitization agreements.

### 2NC – Ext: US No Solve

#### Despite status quo measures, the U.S. needs to do more to ensure offshore drilling safety

Hull, Florida A&M University College of Law Professor, 11

[Eric V., June 14th 2011, “Crude injustice in the gulf: why categorical exclusions for deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico are inconsistent with U.S. and international ocean law and policy.” [http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Crude+injustice+in+the+gulf%3A+why+categorical+exclusions+for+deepwater...-a0258598673](http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Crude%2Binjustice%2Bin%2Bthe%2Bgulf%3A%2Bwhy%2Bcategorical%2Bexclusions%2Bfor%2Bdeepwater...-a0258598673), Accessed 6/30/13, CB]

¶ The accidental release of oil associated with offshore exploration and development activities in the Gulf presents a constant threat to the natural resources of nations in the wider Caribbean basin. In recognition of this constant threat, the United States is also a bound by two regional agreements to protect the Gulf environment from oil pollution. Following the Ixtoc I accident, the U.S. signed an agreement with Mexico that requires both nations to take steps to prevent harm to the marine environment from oil spills. (261) The United States, along with twenty-three coastal states on the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico, also ratified the Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region (Cartagena Convention). (262) That Convention requires parties to:¶ [T]ake all appropriate measures in conformity with international¶ law ... to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the Convention¶ area and to ensure sound environmental management, using for this¶ purpose the best practicable means at their disposal and in¶ accordance with their capabilities. [Art. 4(1)];¶ [T]ake all appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and control¶ pollution of the Convention area resulting directly or indirectly¶ from exploration and exploitation of the sea-bed and its subsoil.¶ [Art. 8]; and¶ [A]ssess within its capabilities ... the potential effects of such¶ projects on the marine environment, particularly in coastal areas,¶ so that appropriate measures may be taken to prevent any¶ substantial pollution of, or significant and harmful changes to,¶ the Convention area. [Art. 12(2)]. (263)¶ The Oil Spill Protocol to the Cartagena Convention further requires contracting parties to cooperate in protecting the marine and coastal environment of the wider Caribbean basin and to ensure they have the means of responding to oil spill incidents under their jurisdiction. (264) ¶ Although the U.S. retains a sovereign right to exploit its natural resources, it must do so in a manner that does not cause harm to neighboring states. That almost happened during the DWH accident, and could happen in the future if greater safeguards are not taken. (265) By failing to conduct adequate environmental reviews and by exempting critical exploration activities from environmental review, MMS violated its obligations under UNCLOS and regional agreements. Given the increasing industry activity in the Gulf, and the movement of that activity into the outer Gulf, the risk of harm posed to other countries from U.S. oil exploration and development activities remains high. The United States must take appropriate steps in recognition of its obligations under international law to ensure that activities occurring under its jurisdiction do not cause harm to neighboring countries.

#### Both Washington and the oil industry have done little to improve offshore drilling safety regulations since the Gulf spill in 2010

Oil Spill Intelligence Report, 2012

[May 3, “Post-Deepwater Horizon Assessments Grade US Progress,” Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, Vol. 35 No. 20, p. 1-3, accessed 6-30-12 on Ebsco, UR]

¶ Post-Deepwater Horizon Assessments Grade US Progress¶ Neither the US government, nor the oil industry,¶ fared well on “report cards” issued in two recent¶ studies of the nation’s progress toward improving¶ the regulation and safety of offshore oil drilling and¶ increasing response capabilities over the two years since the blowout and spill at BP plc’s Macondo/¶ MC252 well in the Gulf of Mexico (see OSIR,¶ 29 April 2010 and subsequent issues). The highest¶ grade, from Oil Spill Commission Action, was a¶ “B” for both advances in safety and environmental¶ protection, and for the Obama Administration’s role¶ in effecting change. Similar actions were given a “D”¶ by Oceana, an international advocacy group working¶ to protect the world’s oceans, with other actions¶ receiving even lower scores in Oceana’s review.¶ Oil Spill Commission Action (OSCAction) was formed in March 2012 by the members of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, established in May 2010 by President Obama to determine the causes of the incident, which resulted in 11 deaths and a spill totaling 4.9 million barrels (nearly 206 million gallons) of oil. The findings of the Commission (see OSIR, 18 November 2010 and 24 February 2011) included a number of recommendations aimed at increasing the odds of averting a future disaster of such magnitude. Commission members formed OSCAction to ensure that their work was not lost as memories of the spill fade. OSCAction operates with a single staff person in addition to the (volunteer) former Commission members, with support from the Walton Family Foundation.¶ OSCAction’s recent booklet, “Assessing Progress — Implementing the Recommendations of the¶ National Oil Spill Commission” (17 April 2012), gives Industry a C+, and the US Congress a D for their accomplishments to date, even “reflecting optimism that the activities currently underway will be completed successfully.” The assessment reviewed five areas of concern: safety and environmental protection (B), spill response and containment (B-), impacts and restoration (C), ensuring adequate [financial] resources (D), and frontier areas — the Arctic (C).¶ The report gives kudos to the US Department of the Interior (DOI) for reorganizing the dysfunctional Minerals Management Service into the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), issuing the interim final Drilling Safety Rule in October 2010, and requiring well containment systems and other safety precautions for deepwater wells.¶ Congress, however, was chastised for failing to take any action to implement the Commission’s recommendations. In fact, the report says that the US House of Representatives “has passed several bills … that actually run contrary to what the Commission concluded was essential for safe, prudent, responsible development of offshore oil resources.” In a recent interview with Platts Energy Weekly TV, William Reilly, former Commission Co-Chair, expressed chagrin that the House Natural Resources Committee was “contemptuous of the Commission,” and “considered them an instrument of an anti-fossil-fuel President.” Congressional action that Reilly and OSCAction would like to see includes passage of the RESTORE Act (see OSIR, 27 October 2011), which would direct 80% of BP’s fines under the US Clean Water Act to Gulf states; “creating a dedicated fee program” using industry tariffs to support regulatory¶ operations; raising the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund’s limit on funds to support the government’s response to future oil spills; and interpreting sanctions to allow the United States to collaborate on preventing and responding to spills in Mexican or Cuban waters.¶ Reilly credited BP with “transforming [the] culture” of drilling safety, and said he believed that the company had “learned its lesson.” However, Oceana’s assessment of industry’s role in improving process safety for offshore drilling contrasts sharply with Reilly’s opinion, assigning an F to industry’s improvements to offshore safety. The group’s recent report, “Offshore Drilling Report Card 2012,” concludes that, across nine categories of recommendations by the Commission and the National Academy of Engineering and the National Research Council (collectively NAE, see OSIR, 30 September 2010), “In no area did government or industry perform satisfactorily.”¶ Oceana issued failing grades for six of the nine categories, including (in addition to industry’s contributions to safety): advancements in oil spill response, planning and capacity; enhancements in well-containment measures; ensuring industry’s accountability and financial responsibility; congressional engagement in developing responsible offshore drilling practices; and oil development in frontier regions. In many respects, Oceana agrees with OSCAction’s assessments, but it does not frame its review with optimism, and delivers harsher judgments across the board. “Both industry and government get F’s,” said Jacqueline Savitz, senior campaign director at Oceana in a recent press release. “Without stronger regulations, and better inspection and enforcement, oil companies will continue to put profits over safety and there will be more problems. It’s not a matter of whether there will be another oil spill, but when.”

### 2NC – Ext: Resilient

#### Extend 1NC 1 – the Gulf of Mexico is resilient --- the most recent study on the 2010 Deep Horizon spill proves that the Gulf can adapt and survive. Oil-eating bacteria eliminate the risk of damage. That’s R&D Magazine 2013.

#### Prefer our evidence –

#### A) It’s backed by scientific evidence --- the aff’s ev comes from pundits.

#### B) It’s comparative --- our evidence is a conclusive study of the Deepwater Horizon spill that the 1AC Craig 11 evidence cites.

#### Our study uses the newest data and concludes that no countermeasures are needed.

**Science Daily**, 4/8/**2013** (Gulf of Mexico Has Greater-Than-Believed Ability to Self-Cleanse Oil Spills, p. <http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/04/130408152733.htm>) [MN]

Hazen's team used a powerful new approach for identifying previously recognized kinds of oil-eating bacteria that contributed to the natural clean-up of the Deepwater Horizon spill. In the past, scientists identified microbes by putting samples of water into laboratory culture dishes, waiting for microbes to grow and then using a microscope to identify the microbes. The new approach, called "ecogenomics," uses genetic and other analyses of the DNA, proteins and other footprints of bacteria to provide a more detailed picture of microbial life in the water. "The bottom line from this research may be that the Gulf of Mexico is more resilient and better able to recover from oil spills than anyone thought," Hazen said. "It shows that we may not need the kinds of heroic measures proposed after the Deepwater Horizon spill, like adding nutrients to speed up the growth of bacteria that breakdown oil, or using genetically engineered bacteria. The Gulf has a broad base of natural bacteria, and they respond to the presence of oil by multiplying quite rapidly."

### 2NC – Ext: Alt Causes

#### Alt causes to oil spills- sunken ships over last two centuries.

Maritime Passive Safety Association 13

[5/22/12, “US Government body confirms growing request for systematic removal of oil from sunken ships”, <http://www.maritimepassivesafety.com/en/2013/05/22/us-government-body-confirms-growing-request-for-systematic-removal-of-oil-from-sunken-ships/>, accessed 6/30/13, ALT]

¶ The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) handed earlier this week a new report to the US Coast Guards showing that sunken ships pose a threat to the environment. The outcome of the report gives credit to concerns growing within the local shore authorities that oil should systematically be removed from ships after an accident happens, a trend highlighted earlier this year by the P&I Working Group on large casualties. As the NOAA study shows, trapped in the tanks and bunkers of sunken ships, the oil can indeed be a threat to the environment even more than 50 years after the sinister.¶ The ships cited as hazards were chosen from 20,000 shipwreck sites in a NOAA database based on factors including the vessel’s size, the likelihood of significant amounts of oil remaining on board, the type of fuel used and the potential environmental effects from spills in the surrounding area.¶ The report by NOAA especially details 87 shipwrecks, most sunk in the first half of the XXth century, which could pollute US waters with oil. Among them, six leaks, mostly situated around Florida coast, are considered dangerous for the environment. The agency is now studying whether oil can be removed from some vessels before they leak while the Coast Guard is including this new info into its plans for addressing marine environmental issues and determine the most appropriate response.

#### Biodiversity loss inevitable

Phys.org 10

[10-26-10, Phys.org, “Continuing biodiversity loss predicted but could be slowed” <http://phys.org/news/2010-10-biodiversity-loss.html#nRlv>, accessed, 7-01-13 AMS]

¶ A new analysis of several major global studies of future species shifts and losses foresees inevitable continuing decline of biodiversity during the 21st century but offers new hope that it could be slowed if emerging policy choices are pursued.¶ Led by experts Henrique Miguel Pereira and Paul Leadley, the 23-member scientific team from nine countries, under the auspices of DIVERSITAS, UNEP-WCMC and the secretariat of the CBD compared results from five recent global environmental assessments and a wide range of peer-reviewed literature examining likely future changes in biodiversity.¶ Published today in the journal Science, the analysis found universal agreement across the studies that fundamental changes are needed in society to avoid high risk of extinctions, declining populations in many species, and large scale shifts in species distributions in the future.¶ Says Dr. Leadley, of the University Paris-Sud, France: "There is no question that business-as-usual development pathways will lead to catastrophic biodiversity loss. Even optimistic scenarios for this century consistently predict extinctions and shrinking populations of many species."

### 2NC – Ext: No Impact

#### Their impact claims are wrong, we still can’t fully comprehend biodiversity

National Science Foundation 12

[9-24-12, National Science Foundation, “Stemming the Tide of Biodiversity Loss on Earth” <http://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=125495>, accessed, 7-01-13 AMS]

¶ Biodiversity research has often focused on a single dimension. For example, investigators have concentrated on the taxonomic diversity or phylogenetic history of a clade (an ancestor and all its descendants), the genetic diversity of a population or a species, or the functional role of a taxon (a group of one or more populations of organisms) in an ecosystem.¶ Although this research has yielded important advances, huge gaps exist in our understanding of biodiversity. We know little about how these various dimensions, individually and in concert, contribute to environmental health, ecosystem stability, productivity and resilience, and biological adaptation to rapid environmental change.

#### **No extinction – biodiversity is recovering**

The Economist 09

[1-15-09, The Economist, “Second life Biologists debate the scale of extinction in the world’s tropical forests” <http://www.economist.com/node/12926042>, accessed, 7-01-13 AMS]

¶ A RARE piece of good news from the world of conservation: the global extinction crisis may have been overstated. The world is unlikely to lose 100 species a day, or half of all species in the lifetime of people now alive, as some have claimed. The bad news, though, is that the lucky survivors are tiny tropical insects that few people care about. The species that are being lost rapidly are the large vertebrates that conservationists were worried about in the first place.¶ This new view of the prospects for biodiversity emerged from a symposium held this week at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, DC, but the controversy over how bad things really are has been brewing since 2006. That was when Joseph Wright of the Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute in Panama and Helene Muller-Landau of the University of Minnesota first suggested that the damage might not be as grim as some feared. They reasoned that because population growth is slowing in many tropical countries, and people are moving to cities, the pressure to cut down primary rainforest is falling and agriculturally marginal land is being abandoned, allowing trees to grow.¶ This regrown “secondary” forest is crucial to the pair's analysis. Within a few decades of land being abandoned, half of the original biomass has returned. Depending on what else is nearby, these new forests may then be colonised by animals and additional plants, and thus support many of the species found in the original forest.¶ Dr Wright and Dr Muller-Landau therefore reckon that in 2030 reasonably unbroken tropical forest will still cover more than a third of its natural range, and after that date its area—at least in Latin America and Asia—could increase. Much of this woodland will be secondary forest, but even so they suggest that in Africa only 16-35% of tropical-forest species will become extinct by 2030, in Asia, 21-24% and, in Latin America, fewer still. Once forest cover does start increasing, the rate of extinction should dwindle.

### There is no warming- more energy is actually lost to space than predicted- this means climate models are flawed because actual measurements have disproven the predictions. - Prefer Taylor it is citing a new groundbreaking peer-reviewed study that takes into account new NASA satellite data.

### AND - there is no better evidence

Wilson ’12 (GLOBAL WARMING: THE SATELLITES DON'T LIE March 3, 2012 7:48 AM | 7 Comments James A. Wilson

Over the summer Forbes Magazine published NASA satellite data indicating the alarmist predictions - even the UN computer models on which they were based - are dead wrong. The study, reported in the peer reviewed journal, Remote Sensing, correlates data from 2000 through 2011. It shows two phenomena surprising to the apostles of doom in the scientific and political community. There is much less heat being trapped in the atmosphere by greenhouse gases - or any other cause - than the models portend, and a lot more of it is being released naturally into space. This is especially true over the oceans. James M. Taylor, a senior fellow for environmental policy at The Heartland Institute and managing editor of Environment and Climate News authored the Forbes article. Credentials don't get any more impeccable.

### AND - Consensus of data

Wilson ’12 (GLOBAL WARMING: THE SATELLITES DON'T LIE March 3, 2012 7:48 AM | 7 Comments James A. Wilson

The latest satellite gathered information is consistent with NOAA and NASA data showing humidity and the formation of cirrus clouds has lagged far behind alarmist predictions as well. These findings, and those of NASA's ERBS satellite show similar patterns of heat exhange for the years 1985 to 1999. In other words, we are simply not going to hell in a climate change hand basket.

### Meta Framing Question – All of their evidence should be viewed with a lens of skepticism – it over-estimates the importance of the US and under estimates the power of external factors psychology studies – that’s Preble – even if their heg good args could be true they assume pre 9/11 heg

Lieven, 6 (Anatol, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment in the Global Policy Program, Demon in the Cellar, Carnegie, Prospect Magazine, March http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1467)

Because of a deep-rooted (and partly justified) belief in American exceptionalism, and the decline of the study of history, Americans are not used to studying their nationalism in a western historical context. It is important that they begin to do so. Nobody looking at the history of nationalist Europe in the century or so before 1945 would suggest that the US should follow such a path. In particular, American nationalism is beginning to conflict with any enlightened or even rational version of American imperialism: that is to say, with the interests of the US as world hegemon. A relatively benign version of indirect American imperial dominance is by no means unacceptable to many people round the world - both because they often have neighbours whom they fear more than America, and because their leaders are increasingly integrated into a global capitalist elite whose values are largely defined by those of America. But American imperial power in the service of narrow American and Israeli nationalism is a very different matter, and an unstable base for hegemony. It involves power over the world without any responsibility for global problems and without any responsiveness to others' concerns. This is not a matter of sentimental or naive liberal humanism. The US, as unquestioned king of the international order, has a truly vital national and imperial interest in preserving and strengthening it with new rules and conventions. The us is in part simply an old European state which avoided the catastrophes that nationalism brought upon Europe in the 20th century. Its nationalism thus retains an intensity which Europeans have had kicked out of them by history. 72 per cent of Americans say they are "very proud" of their nationality, compared to 49 per cent of Britons, 39 per cent of Italians and just 20 per cent of the Dutch. But the dangers of unreflective nationalist sentiments remain all too obvious. Nationalism thrives on irrational hatreds, and the portrayal of other nations or ethno-religious groups as irredeemably wicked and hostile. Yesterday this was true of the attitudes of many American nationalists to the Soviet Union. Today it risks becoming the case with regard to the Arab and Muslim worlds, or to any country which defies American wishes. The run-up to the war in Iraq saw an astonishing explosion of chauvinism directed against France and Germany.

### AND – their so called “research” is merely a knee jerk reaction to the overwhelming evidence of US decline – their analysis is clouted with conceptual confusion poor methodology

### Heg doesn’t solve war – nations who dislike the US will never listen – increasing power only increases resentment – nations who support the US will do so regardless of US power - that’s Peble 10’

### Empirics – War declines when the US cut its forces by 25 percent – no nation enhanced its military and no power vacuums occurred – the world acted as if internal war was not a possibility – that’s Fetwise 10’

### Prefer our evidence – their ev is overly hyperbolic and written by conservative hacks who aren’t even peer reviewed

Fettweis 11 [Christopher J. Fettweis - Department of Political Science Tulane University and Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, “Free Riding or Restraint Examining European Grand Strategy”, Comparative Strategy; Sep/Oct2011, Vol. 30 Issue 4, p316-332, 17p]

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. 51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.” 52 On the other hand, if the paciﬁc trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conﬂict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending ﬁgures by themselves are insufﬁcient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was signiﬁcantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global paciﬁc trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never ﬁnal; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conﬂict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulﬁlled. If increases in conﬂict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

### AND – Statistics prove heg increases the probability and magnitude of global warfare

Montiero 12 [Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful”, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 9–40]

Wohlforth claims not only that the unipole can stave off challenges and preclude major power rivalries, but also that it is able to prevent conflicts among other states and create incentives for them to side with it. 39 The unipole’s advantage is so great that it can settle any quarrel in which it intervenes. As Wohlforth writes, “For as long as unipolarity obtains....second-tier states are less likely to engage in conflict-prone rivalries for security or prestige. Once the sole pole takes sides, there can be little doubt about which party will prevail.” 40 This is the core logic of Wohlforth’s argument that unipolarity is peaceful. But what specifically does his argument say about each of the six possible kinds of war I identified in the previous section? Clearly, great power war is impossible in a unipolar world. In Wohlforth’s famous formulation: “Two states measured up in 1990. One is gone. No new pole has appeared: 2 1 1.” 41 Furthermore, by arguing that unipolarity precludes hegemonic rivalries, Wohlforth makes no room for wars between the sole great power and major powers. These are, according to him, the two main reasons why a unipolar world is peaceful. Unipolarity, he writes, “means the absence of two big problems that bedeviled the statesmen of past epochs: hegemonic rivalry and balance-of-power politics among major powers.” 42 I agree with Wohlforth on these two points, but they are only part of the picture. Granted, the absence of great power wars is an important contribution toward peace, but great power competition—and the conflict it might engender—would signal the emergence of one or more peer competitors to the unipole, and thus indicate that a transition to a bipolar or multipolar system was already under way. In this sense, great power conflict should be discussed within the context of unipolar durability, not unipolar peace. Indeed, including this subject in discussions of unipolar peacefulness parallels the mistakes made in the debate about the Cold War bipolar system. Then, arguments about how the two superpowers were unlikely to fight each other were often taken to mean that the system was peaceful. This thinking ignored the possibility of wars between a superpower and a lesser state, as well as armed conflicts among two or more lesser states, often acting as great power proxies. 43 In addition, Wohlforth claims that wars among major powers are unlikely, because the unipole will prevent conflict from erupting among important states. He writes, “The sole pole’s power advantages matter only to the degree that it is engaged, and it is most likely to be engaged in politics among the other major powers. 44 I agree that if the unipole were to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance, major power wars would be unlikely. Yet, there is no compelling reason to expect that it will always follow such a course. Should the unipole decide to disengage, as Wohlforth implies, major power wars would be possible. At the same time, Wohlforth argues that the unipole’s power preponderance makes the expected costs of balancing prohibitive, leading minor powers to bandwagon. This is his explanation for the absence of wars between the sole great power and minor powers. But, as I show, the costs of balancing relative to bandwagoning vary among minor powers. So Wohlforth’s argument underplays the likelihood of this type of war. Finally, Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter. As Wohlforth explains, his argument “applies with less force to potential security competition between regional powers, or between a second-tier state and a lesser power with which the system leader lacks close ties.” 45 Despite this caveat, Wohlforth does not fully explore the consequences of potential conflict between major and minor powers or among the latter for his view that unipolarity leads to peace. How well, then, does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War? Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity. 46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all the systems, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were spent at war. In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent. In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war. This is by far the highest percentage in all three systems. Furthermore, during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18.2 percent—or more than four times higher. 47 These figures provide no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful. 48 In sum, the argument that unipolarity makes for peace is heavily weighted toward interactions among the most powerful states in the system. This should come as no surprise given that Wohlforth makes a structural argument: peace flows from the unipolar structure of international politics, not from any particular characteristic of the unipole. 49 Structural analyses of the international system are usually centered on interactions between great powers. 50 As Waltz writes, “The theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era.” 51 In the sections that follow, however, I show that in the case of unipolarity, an investigation of its peacefulness must consider potential causes of conflict beyond interactions between the most important states in the system.

### AND – Their evidence cites the HSR – which concludes neg

Human Security Report ’10 (Embargoed until 2 December 2010, 11:00am EST Human Security Report Project. Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

As with other realist claims, there are reasons for skepticism about the peace through preponderance thesis. First, if it were true, we might expect that the most powerful states would experience the least warfare. However, since the end of World War II, the opposite has in fact been the case. Between 1946 and 2008, the four countries that had been involved in the greatest number of international conflicts were France, the UK, the US, and Russia/USSR.19 Yet, these were four of the most powerful conventional military powers in the world— and they all had nuclear weapons. The fact that major powers tend to be more involved in international conflicts than minor powers is not surprising. Fighting international wars requires the capacity to project substantial military power across national frontiers and often over very long distances. Few countries have this capacity; major powers have it by definition.

### No conflicts resulted from the recession – disproves the impact

Barnett 9—senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC (Thomas, The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis, 25 August 2009, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: •No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); •The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); •Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); •No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); •A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and •No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role.

### History is decided

Ferguson 6— Laurence A. Tisch prof of History at Harvard. William Ziegler of Business Administration at Harvard. MA and D.Phil from Glasgow and Oxford (Niall, “The Next War of the World,” September/October 2006, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/09/the\_next\_war\_of\_the\_world.html)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

### Robust studies prove

Miller 2k – Professor of Management, Ottawa (Morris, Poverty As A Cause Of Wars?, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG4draft1.htm)

Thus, these armed conflicts can hardly be said to be caused by poverty as a principal factor when the greed and envy of leaders and their hegemonic ambitions provide sufficient cause. The poor would appear to be more the victims than the perpetrators of armed conflict. It might be alleged that some dramatic event or rapid sequence of those types of events that lead to the exacerbation of poverty might be the catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who might be tempted to seek a diversion by finding/fabricating an enemy and going to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since World War II they concluded that Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong... The severity of economic crisis---as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth---bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes. A more direct role was played by political variables such as ideological polarization, labor radicalism, guerilla insurgencies and an anti-Communist military... (In democratic states) such changes seldom lead to an outbreak of violence (while) in the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another.

### Econ collapse saps resources from military aggression

Bennett 2k – PolSci Prof, Penn State (Scott and Timothy Nordstrom, Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Ebsco)

Conflict settlement is also a distinct route to dealing with internal problems that leaders in rivalries may pursue when faced with internal problems. Military competition between states requires large amounts of resources, and rivals require even more attention. Leaders may choose to negotiate a settlement that ends a rivalry to free up important resources that may be reallocated to the domestic economy. In a “guns versus butter” world of economic trade-offs, when a state can no longer afford to pay the expenses associated with competition in a rivalry, it is quite rational for leaders to reduce costs by ending a rivalry. This gain (a peace dividend) could be achieved at any time by ending a rivalry. However, such a gain is likely to be most important and attractive to leaders when internal conditions are bad and the leader is seeking ways to alleviate active problems. Support for policy change away from continued rivalry is more likely to develop when the economic situation sours and elites and masses are looking for ways to improve a worsening situation. It is at these times that the pressure to cut military investment will be greatest and that state leaders will be forced to recognize the difficulty of continuing to pay for a rivalry. Among other things, this argument also encompasses the view that the cold war ended becausethe Unionof Soviet Socialist Republics could no longer compete economically with the United States.

### Econ decline makes leaders cautious not aggressive

Boehmer 2007 – political science professor at the University of Texas (Charles, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”, WEA)

The theory presented earlier predicts that lower rates of growth suppress participation in foreign conflicts, particularly concerning conflict initiation and escalation to combat. To sustain combat, states need to be militarily prepared and not open up a second frosnt when they are already fighting, or may fear, domestic opposition. A good example would be when the various Afghani resistance fighters expelled the Soviet Union from their territory, but the Taliban crumbled when it had to face the combined forces of the United States and Northern Alliance insurrection. Yet the coefficient for GDP growth and MID initiations was negative but insignificant. However, considering that there are many reasons why states fight, the logic presented earlier should hold especially in regard to the risk of participating in more severe conflicts. Threats to use military force may be safe to make and may be made with both external and internal actors in mind, but in the end may remain mere cheap talk that does not risk escalation if there is a chance to back down. Chiozza and Goemans (2004b) found that secure leaders were more likely to become involved in war than insecure leaders, supporting the theory and evidence presented here. We should find that leaders who face domestic opposition and a poorly performing economy shy away from situations that could escalate to combat if doing so would compromise their ability to retain power.

1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)